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GUNS OF DESTINY

Field Artillery in the Trenton-Princeton Campaign
25 December 1776 to 3 January 1777

By JAC WELLER*

IN WASHINGTON'S own words, "The game was pretty nearly up," as Christmas approached in 1776. He and his Continental Army had been driven from Long Island, Manhattan Island, a good deal of lower New York state and finally across New Jersey into Pennsylvania. The army had shown itself lacking in discipline and efficiency, to say the very least. Many were loud in their condemnation of its commander. The forces available to oppose about 30,000 British and Hessian professionals in the New York theatre of operations had shrunk from 25,000 to less than 8,000. Only about half of these were with Washington on the Pennsylvania side of the Delaware. The condition of the soldiers who remained was pitiable: Shoes and blankets were in short supply, food was poor and scanty, and all tents had been lost. Worst of all, most of these men would be going home at the end of the year, their term of enlistment completed. The Loyalists were jubilant and, conversely, Whig sentiment had never been so pessimistic.

Somehow, mostly from within himself, Washington found the power and the courage to strike back. His famous counter punches at Trenton and Princeton restored alike the military and the political situations.

*Editorial Note: Readers will recall Jac Weller as the author of the outstanding study on "The Logistics of Nathan Bedford Forrest," in *Military Affairs*, XVII, 4 (Winter, 1953). In addition to the works specifically cited in the footnotes, he found the following secondary sources useful: Robert G. Albion, *Introduction to Military History* (New York, 1929); Benson J. Lossing, *The Pictorial Field Book of the American Revolution* (New York, 1850-52); Leonard Lundin, *Cockpit of the Revolution* (Princeton, 1940); and Thomas J. Wertenbaker, *The Battle of Princeton* (Princeton, 1922).

This campaign was his first real success. Frederick the Great is said to have placed it among the best of all time. The two battles, essentially small in themselves, yielded tremendous results. The British were practically thrown out of New Jersey. For the first time, Washington took his ultimately victorious strategic position facing the British in New York. His center was at Morristown behind the unassailable defenses at Middlebrook. One flank stretched to the Highlands of the Hudson; the other flank was anchored in the strong Whig territory around Philadelphia and to the South.

The part played by the field artillery in this campaign, in these ten days which changed the fate of the new country, is very great indeed. Essentially, as in all other actions, Washington's whole team, rather than individual members of it, deserves praise; however, Knox's gunners and their pieces contributed far more than their share to these successes. At Trenton when the shoulder firearms of both sides were rendered silent by wet pans, priming and frizzens, the field pieces bore almost the whole of the fire fight. The artillery was the bad-weather arm of the Revolution. The Hessian guns fired only a few rounds; Knox's were in action from beginning to end. The proportion of number of pieces to 1,000 infantry was at least three times that normal in the eighteenth century.

For a week following the battle at Trenton, both armies moved around indecisively. By 2 January 1777, however, Cornwallis had at Princeton close to 8,000 regulars. These

advanced at daybreak towards Trenton where Washington had assembled his army. Two field guns were essential to Washington for a series of holding actions on the road; four more were used in an earthwork at the edge of town. The entire Continental artillery was in action in throwing back the British attack across the Assunpink after they had taken most of Trenton. Knox's fire at dusk from the heights to the south was the heaviest ever delivered on any field anywhere in the Western Hemisphere until that time. This whole "Second Battle of Trenton" was more important than is usually realized.

That night Washington slipped quietly away to his right out of a critical position by a march around Cornwallis's main army; he met a secondary British force at Princeton. For a short interval of time the fate of the young nation hung by a thread. Washington and the Continental Army were on the verge of defeat. Two field pieces of Moulder's battery posted near the Thomas Clarke house held up the victorious British attack and gave time for our more numerous forces to rally under Washington's heroic example, and then win overwhelmingly.

The Colonies, from Massachusetts to Georgia, had a number of artillery pieces at every important port. These were in permanent installations for use mainly against European enemies. Some of the inland fortifications had artillery; but these were fixed rather than mobile. Field pieces which travelled along with an army were almost unknown in America before the Revolution. One of the causes of Braddock's fiasco was his insistence upon taking along several howitzers and field guns which required a road to be cut through the wilderness.¹ Wolfe won his great battle for the British

and Americans against the French on the plains of Abraham outside of Quebec assisted by only one piece of field artillery.² The Colonial roads were so bad that even small field guns were handicaps to troop movements. Few areas were sufficiently clear to give reasonable fields of fire.

Nevertheless, at several places in the Colonies a gunnery tradition existed. The Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company in Boston was organized in 1637, and seems to have been of political and social as well as military importance.³ They had a well trained and equipped unit of field artillery — perhaps the only one in the Colonies, and they were also something of a military academy. The Company received instruction from a British artillery command that remained in Boston throughout the winter of 1766-67.⁴ At the opening of the Revolution, they had three brass 3-pounders of the very latest design. This organization had been in action with the Royal Artillery against Louisburg in 1745, although at that time they were mainly handling siege guns.⁵

There were other groups of colonials who knew a good deal about handling the guns they had in their fortifications. Moultrie's artillery on Sullivan's Island certainly did a superb job against the British Navy at Charleston in 1775.⁶ Both Charleston and Philadelphia had some trained artillerymen,⁷ and some of the latter performed well in Fort Mifflin on the Delaware in 1777.

²Graham, p. 17.

³Albert Manucy, *Artillery through the Ages* (Washington, 1949) p. 10; *passim*, the charter was dated 1638; hereafter Manucy.

⁴Francis I. Drake, *Life and Correspondence of Henry Knox* (Boston, 1873) p. 126; hereafter, Drake.


⁵Manucy, p. 9; William E. Birkhimer, *History of the Organization, Administration, Materiel and Tactics of the Artillery* (Washington, D. C., 1884), p. 1; hereafter, Birkhimer.

⁶J. W. Fortescue, *A History of the British Army*, XIII Vols. (London, 1915) III, 183; hereafter, Fortescue.

⁷Birkhimer, p. 1.

¹C. A. L. Graham, *The Story of the Royal Regiment of Artillery* (Woolwich, 1944) p. 13; hereafter, Graham. Douglas S. Freeman, *George Washington*, II, 64-65; hereafter Freeman.

TRENTON—PRINCETON CAMPAIGN AREA



Gridley's Continental artillery regiment was organized outside Boston in the spring of 1775, in large part from the Whig personnel of the Boston artillery units.⁸ This first organization proved to be unsatisfactory because of ineffectual leadership and nepotism both in camp and at Bunker Hill, where it lost five of its six pieces and had one of its majors dismissed from the service for misconduct.⁹ It was reorganized during the following winter under the command of young Henry Knox as Colonel. Knox is one of the outstanding men in our entire military history. Knox and Nathanael Greene, although both young and with no active campaigning behind them at the start of hostilities, had studied the military arts extensively, especially those branches pertaining to artillery and fortifications.¹⁰ Knox was familiar with British artillery theory and practice. Under him, the Continental artillery immediately began to function in a manner second to no other arm in the army. The Continental artillery was patterned on the Royal Artillery; it was consistently good throughout the Revolution. It occasionally achieved real greatness, particularly during the short campaign under discussion. In November of 1776, Congress authorized enlarging the artillery to five battalions of twelve companies each. Knox was made a brigadier general of artillery on 27 December 1776, even before the Continental Congress heard of the remarkable contributions he and his gunners made to the victory at Trenton.

CONTINENTAL ARTILLERY MATÉRIEL

Initially, the Continental artillery was forced to use any piece available. Knox was never able to achieve complete uniformity,

⁸Paddock's Artillery Company probably furnished more trained men than the Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company. Both from Boston; Drake, p. 126.

⁹Major Scarborough Gridley, Birkhimer, p. 2.

¹⁰Noah Brooks in *Henry Knox: A Soldier of the Revolution*, quotes a letter from Miss Dorothy Dudley to Miss Esther Livingston, 19 April 1776, p. 34, and *passim*.

even in his field guns. By the end of November of 1776, however, the guns and howitzers that remained with the army were probably the best of a far larger initial armament. None was lost during the retreat across New Jersey. British brass 3-pounders and 6-pounders of the type designed by the great John Muller about 1755 were the most desirable guns; the Muller 5.5-inch howitzer was the best in its class.¹¹ However, some of the pieces in action at Trenton and Princeton were of iron. At least one battery was equipped with French 4-pounders.

French artillery matériel used in the Continental service is most interesting. It began to arrive in the fall of 1776, more than a year before the French declaration of war on Great Britain; the famous Silas Deane was able to do a tremendous lot for us in Paris during 1776.¹² The French field pieces in this country were mounted in British (or Muller) type bracket carriages.¹³ Since the axles were of wood, these could be fabricated locally in accordance with Muller's *Treatise* which was the only source of such information available in the Colonies.¹⁴

In addition to the three types of guns and one howitzer known to be in the Continental Army during this campaign, there were at least two additional types of guns and one additional type of howitzer in use by the British forces. The Royal Artillery which formed a part of Cornwallis's force on 2 January 1771, had four light 12-pounder guns.¹⁵ The Hessian force in Trenton on 26 December 1776, had six brass Hessian 3-pounder guns. These were entirely different

¹¹Knox to Washington and Congress, 1 February 1777; Birkhimer, p. 5.

¹²*Encyclopedia Britannica*, 14th Edition, vol. 7, p. 107; Fortescue, III, 199, says 250 pieces of artillery in 1776.

¹³Harry C. Larter, Jr., "Matériel of the First American Light Artillery," *Military Collector and Historian*, September, 1952, p. 55.

¹⁴Birkhimer, pp. 223-26.

¹⁵William S. Stryker, *The Battles of Trenton and Princeton* (Boston, 1898), p. 248; hereafter, Stryker.

from the Muller type 3-pounders; they were not only larger in bore than the British 3-pounders, but also larger than the French 4-pounders.¹⁶ One of these, later recaptured by the British at Brandywine, had been re-bored by the Continentals to a standard 6-pounder.¹⁷ This extreme confusion was occasioned in part by European "pounds" and "inches" differing radically from one country to another before the almost universal adoption of the metric system. Another source of variation was the amount of "windage"—the difference between minimum bore and maximum shot diameter—used in different countries.

There was probably a "32-pounder" howitzer in the earthworks hastily thrown up at head of Nassau Street in Princeton.¹⁸ Both the bores and designations of howitzers during the Revolution are open to considerable question. These weapons ordinarily did not fire round shot; canister and grape were their

normal projectiles. They did fire shell during the campaign in question;¹⁹ however, extra windage would not have been a great disadvantage for howitzer type fire.²⁰ The British nomenclature for their howitzers stated nominal bore diameter in inches, but a projectile weight designation was not unknown. A howitzer cast in Philadelphia for the Continental Army in 1775 was called a 5.5-inch piece; conceivably, it could have been known as a "24-pounder."

A table is shown below giving principal dimensions and data of all the field pieces known to have been used by both sides in this campaign. It should be borne in mind that this was in the days before interchangeability of parts. Considerable variation was inevitable.²¹ Pieces, nominally of the same type, might be different in appearance and in some cases even in important dimensions.²² The tabulations shown are those normal for the pieces in question.²³

	<i>I n I n c h e s</i>		<i>I n P o u n d s</i>			<i>Horses</i>
	<i>Diameter of Bore</i>	<i>Length of Piece Less Cascabel</i>	<i>Diameter of Shot</i>	<i>Weight of Tube</i>	<i>Weight of Carriage</i>	<i>Normally Required</i>
<i>British Type Guns</i>						
3-Pdr.	3.00	46.0	2.90	300	350	1
6-Pdr.	3.67	55.5	3.50	600	700	2
12-Pdr. Light	4.60	58.0	4.40	900	850	3
<i>British Type Howitzers</i>						
5.5-Inch	5.6	28.0	—	475	750	2
6-Inch	6.5	32.5	—	700	950	3
<i>Hessian Guns</i>						
3-Pdr.	3.52	52.0	3.40	450	450	2
<i>French Guns</i> ²⁴						
4-Pdr. New	3.31	58.0	3.20	700	700	2
4-Pdr. Old	3.31	78.0	3.20	900	800	3

¹⁶According to DeTousard, Prussian 3-pounders had a bore of 3.52 English inches, whereas the English 3-pounder had a bore of about 3.00 inches; the French 4-pounder had a bore of 3.31 English inches, and the English and American 6-pounder a bore of 3.67 inches.

¹⁷*Letters of Major Baurmeister to Colonel Von Jungkenn, 1777-1778*, edited by Bernard A. Uhlendorf and Edna Vosper (Philadelphia, 1937), p. 17; hereafter, Baurmeister.

¹⁸Stryker, p. 291.

¹⁹Knox to Mrs. Knox, 28 December 1776; in all matters relating to artillery matériel Knox's statements have been followed.

²⁰The bore diameter of a surviving British Revolutionary howitzer in Yorktown today is 6.8 inches; it was nominally a 6-inch howitzer.

²¹Eight French 4-pounders, all of the same nominal type, presently at Washington's Headquarters at Newburgh, New York, varied in weight from 622 to 662 French pounds when completed, according to their original markings.

²²There were at least four types of brass 3-pounders in the British service at the same time, weighing from 200 to almost 400 pounds; Louis DeTousard, *Artillerist's Companion* (Philadelphia, 1809), II, 201; hereafter, DeTousard.

As has been intimated, the Muller type carriage was used exclusively by both sides, save for the Hessian guns. Muller's *Treatise*, so very important during the war and in the study of it, shows two types of wheeled field carriages. Both used in this campaign. The bracket type, where the members holding the trunnions are separate heavy planks forming both the cheeks and the trail was most common. These two members are connected by three brackets, or transoms, and the wooden axle; there is usually an obtuse angle downward about half way back. This type of carriage required a limber.

A good deal more is known of the Muller type Continental carriages than of the various limbers which were attached to them for transportation on the march. The standard Muller limber common in the British Army called for wheels substantially of the same diameter as those on the carriage;²³ although, from contemporary reports and sketches, it is probable that most any combination of two wheels may have been used as a limber in the American service.

The Muller limber had double shafts for one horse; additional animals were hitched in tandem in front. The drivers normally walked beside their teams. All battlefield artillery maneuvering was done by means of drag ropes and hand spikes.²⁴ In both the British and American services, drivers were not officially soldiers until many years after the war.

²³This table was compiled in a logical pattern on the basis of available references. It may be noted that Muller and DeTousard do not agree in all cases, and sometimes they do not agree with themselves.

²⁴The French field guns were lightened and shortened about 1760, according to DeTousard; surviving specimens indicate that this change took place at least five years before. Three 4-pounders now at Newburgh cast by Berenger at Douay in 1756 are all of the new type.

²⁵Carriage wheels were 51 inches in diameter, or a little larger; limber wheels 48 inches for the 6- and 12-pounders and 45 inches for the 3-pounders. John Muller, *Treatise on Artillery* (Philadelphia, 1779), pp. 115-16.

The second type of carriage was known as the Galloper. This required entirely different construction from the usual Muller bracket carriage, as no limber at all was used. A single horse was placed in the heavy double shafts of the carriage itself. These shafts were sufficiently strong to support the weapon in recoil. A powerful draft animal could pull a 3-pounder in a Galloper carriage quite satisfactorily. He was capable of considerable speed over short distances on good terrain, if the driver was mounted on a separate animal. Presumably, this use gave rise to the name. This was at one time the standard infantry-accompanying carriage used in the British Army. The Galloper form of carriage could carry a 6-pounder gun as well, although apparently it was more commonly used with 1.5- and 3-pounders.

There was a third type of field carriage used at one time or another in the American Revolution. This was called the Grasshopper carriage; it was a fairly flexible mounting for artillery pieces up to and including light 3-pounders, made of ash, or oak, without wheels. This arrangement was transported on the march in a wagon; in action, it was picked up bodily and carried by its crew. It would have been most unsatisfactory in either army because of the difficulties of transporting it long distances over poor roads. No records of its use in the campaign in question are known.

Transporting ammunition was a problem never completely solved by field artillery before the use of caissons and limber chests. Neither of these was used during the Revolution. In both the bracket carriage and the Galloper, a small supply of ammunition was carried in boxes on either side of the piece. The limber was not used for carrying either gunners or ammunition.

²⁶Birkhimer, p. 2; Sergeant White's Narration in Stryker, p. 479.

The British ammunition wagon of this period was little more than a sturdily built farm wagon with rail bottom and stake and rail sides, provided with relatively low bows (bails) and a canvas cover. The structure of the wagon can be appreciated by the fact that the same vehicle was converted into a bread wagon by lining the bottom and sides with wicker work. The tumbril, normally used for transporting pioneer's tools, served equally well for powder in barrels. The 100-pound barrel was 15 inches in diameter top and bottom and 30 inches high. The tumbril too was provided with bows and a canvas cover which could be waterproofed. Only the powder cart with its central-lined powder compartment, its separate shot boxes and its peaked roof covered with oilcloth can be considered as a special single-purpose vehicle.

Knox had very satisfactory ammunition wagons and tool-and-powder carts in the regular sturdy farm vehicles and city carts of the Colonies, at least by the middle of the war. However, his vehicles of this type in the Trenton-Princeton campaign were probably limited.²⁷ Any carts at all were pressed into service.

Field guns fired solid cast-iron shot most of the time. For close-range work, the pieces were loaded with multiple projectiles known as grape or canister without distinction. Howitzers fired grape and canister of approximately the same type, and shell. The latter, sometimes called bombs or howitzers, were not so frequently employed in action during the Revolution in the field as is sometimes stated, even from howitzers.

THE GUNS AT TRENTON

With the above technical background, let us return to the desperate offensive across the Delaware on Christmas night. Travelling at approximately 20 miles per hour in an automobile, you now cross over in 36 seconds,

²⁷Knox's suggestions to Congress in Birkhimer, p. 5.

summer or winter, rain or shine, where McConkey's Ferry, called on the Jersey side, John's or Johnson's Ferry, once ran. One sleety December night a year ago the writer walked down to the bank on the Pennsylvania side of the river. The Delaware was flowing bank full with ice, swiftly and treacherously. The lights on the opposite shore were just discernible through the sleet and murk. No reasonable reward would have persuaded me to attempt that crossing in any form of rowboat, even unencumbered by artillery, horses, and the like. We have all read so much of Washington's feat that we now take it for granted. In all seriousness, it was as heroic and skillful an operation as can be found in military history.

Even before the effort started, the guns had a large part in the planning of the campaign. In direct contrast to the small, or negligible, importance of artillery in Colonial America and in some of the early actions fought by the Continental Army, the entire crossing of the Delaware was subordinated to the passage of the field pieces under the direction of Henry Knox. Eighteen guns and howitzers were ferried across the river, along with about 2,400 men.²⁸ Knox's great booming voice seems to have served as a public address system in marshalling the units of both infantry and artillery for their trip across the river; he and Colonel Glover controlled the boat crews of the latter's Marblehead regiment in their passages to and fro.²⁹

The eighteen pieces of field artillery to about 2,100 infantry is an almost unheard of proportion. The usual ratio was two or three pieces per thousand foot-soldiers. This ratio

²⁸Knox to Mrs. Knox states clearly "eighteen pieces," both guns and howitzers; others give both 16 and 20. Knox certainly ought to have known.

²⁹Sometimes the delay in crossing the Delaware is placed as high as four hours; however, as the actual battle began about 8:00 a.m. and it isn't light until after 6:00 at this time of year, two hours seems to be the maximum.

has remained fairly constant from Marlborough to World War II. Deviation from such a standard can be traced to two main factors. First, as already mentioned, the artillery was considered to be the wet-weather weapon. The ammunition carried by an infantryman would often refuse to function in damp weather. It was difficult to load a musket in really wet weather and get it to fire. The gunners, on the other hand, could plug up the vents and muzzles of their pieces and keep the entire inside of the weapon completely dry. There were standard coverings described in regulations; but it is unlikely that the Continental batteries were so equipped, although some simple and efficient leather devices were probably used. Their ammunition chests were practically waterproof. The powder charges in those days were put up by the gunners themselves; they could be encased in starched and tallowed cloth, so as to stand a sprinkle during the short interval from the chest to the gun. This cartridge could be pierced through the

vent after it was in place. Dry priming from a flask could be applied directly into the vent and shielded if necessary. Either slow match or port fire, used to fire the priming, once alight, would function in rain with a little care from the user.

The second factor causing this abnormally large proportion of artillery is more psychological than material. The Continental gunners had a high morale throughout their entire organization. They could be depended upon to stand and fight. They were, in addition, capable of very greatly augmenting the morale and solidarity of more or less inexperienced infantry. Washington and his generals knew all this and planned accordingly.

The Continental Army was entirely over the river and on its way in one column to Trenton, but separated into two columns at Birmingham.³⁰ This was done so as to strike the town from opposite ends at approximately the same time. Sullivan commanded the right column which advanced by the river

GREENE'S COLUMN

Battery Commander	Pieces	Organization
Forrest	Two 6-pounder guns; two 5.5-inch howitzers	Second Company of the Pennsylvania State Artillery
Hamilton	Two 6-pounder guns	New York State Artillery Company
Bauman	Three 3-pounder guns	New York Company of the Continental Artillery

SULLIVAN'S COLUMN

Sergeant	Two 6-pounder guns	Massachusetts Company of Continental Artillery
Neil	Two 3-pounder guns	Eastern Company of New Jersey State Artillery
Hugg	Two 3-pounder guns	Western Company of New Jersey State Artillery
Moulder	Three 4-pounder guns	Second Company of Philadelphia Associates

³⁰For more than a century, there has been a difference of opinion as to where the army divided; those who do not accept Wilkinson's statement in his *Memoirs* (Philadelphia, 1816) as to Birmingham, place the dividing point according to Forrest at Bear Tavern. If one walks over this territory today, keeping in mind the strategic situation, Birmingham appears far more logical.

Bear Tavern was too soon; it would have separated the two divisions by too great a distance and for too long a time. Besides, Forrest contradicts himself in the next paragraph when he says that, "Washington at Birmingham received a message from Sullivan. . . ." Forrest quoted in *Trenton Battle Monument and Washington's Campaign* (Trenton, 1951), p. 10.

road. Greene commanded the left which turned into the Pennington road before reaching Trenton. Sullivan's column seems to have been slightly the weaker, although each had nine field pieces. Both Washington and Knox accompanied Greene's column. The probable organization and composition of the artillery is given just above.³¹

The importance of the artillery in Washington's tactical plan can be estimated from the fact that four pieces of artillery were placed at the very head of each column, ready to go into action at a moment's notice. These pieces were undoubtedly already loaded with muzzles and vents plugged with waterproof stuff.

More is known of the tactical movements of the left column under Greene than of the right under Sullivan, perhaps because of the presence of Washington and Knox with the former. Forrest's company of guns and howitzers was at the very head of Greene's column. It moved into the intersection of King Street and Queen Street at the beginning of the battle precisely in accordance with the plan worked out in Pennsylvania days before. These two streets almost ran together at the head of the village. To control them with artillery was to control the village. The pieces probably had been unlimbered 200 or 300 yards outside of town and then drawn into position by the cannoneers. Every piece fired.

Hamilton's battery seems to have arrived shortly after the action started. Forrest moved all his guns over to Queen Street. Hamilton's two guns were firing down King Street during the abortive attempts of the Hessians to advance up that street. Probably four of the six Hessian field guns were in

action briefly in the middle of the village, but were silenced and then taken.

One of Forrest's howitzers broke its axle on the third discharge;³² but the other five pieces contributed greatly to the quick driving of the Hessians from the village. It is probable that the field guns were firing round shot and the howitzers both grape and explosive shell.³³ The virtue of the latter was two-fold; as fired in the field, howitzers were usually directed at low angles of elevation similar to guns. The shells would bound along at low velocity with burning fuses. They were quite capable of cutting a man in half and continuing their relatively slow movement until they exploded. In the meantime, they were visible to all and destroyed morale and solidarity of formation, at least momentarily.

The Hessian commander, Colonel Rahl, after being driven from the village, made two attempts to retake it; these were made approximately perpendicular to King and Queen Streets. At the time of the first, Forrest's and Hamilton's batteries were still at or near their original position where these two streets came together. The artillery fire down King Street which took the Hessians in the flank broke the first attack almost as soon as the enemy left the protection of the houses and entered the street.

About this time, Bauman's battery, the last in Greene's column, came up and moved out to the extreme left of Greene's division which now encircled the village to the north and east. While the infantry brigades of Mercer and Stirling were fighting in the streets and houses, Washington had ordered those of DeFenoy and Stephen to form a line well to the east extending to the Assunpink, completely cutting off any retreat to

³¹This tabulation is based largely on Stryker; certain inconsistencies have been logically dealt with, and probabilities stated. It is emphasized that this is not exact, but merely a probable arrangement of pieces in the various batteries, or companies as they were then called.

³²Sergeant White's Narration, Stryker, p. 479.

³³Shells from howitzers would be logical, but not from guns; Bill, p. 53, mentions them, but from the wrong pieces. On page 56, the shells mentioned are from the right battery.

Princeton. Bauman's three guns were probably placed where these two brigades joined.

Soon the village was cleared. Rahl and von Dechow were endeavoring to organize their force in an apple orchard to the east. The battery of Forrest, and probably that of Hamilton also, were now moved farther east out of the village and put into position to sweep the eastern approaches to it. Hardly had they arrived, when the Hessians attacked the village again and received an enfilade fire from these pieces and probably Bauman's as well.

This attack was beaten completely; both Rahl and von Dechow were mortally wounded. The surviving Hessians retreated in disorder. The Continental division under Greene, probably now under the direct control of Washington, seems to have practically surrounded two of the three Hessian regiments. Hamilton's battery came south and faced these two from the west. Forrest and Bauman came forward on the north and east. These Hessians, without artillery, and with most of their muskets unable to fire because of the weather, surrendered.

Not nearly so much is known of the actual tactical maneuvering of Sullivan's division and the four batteries of artillery which accompanied it. Sargent's battery and either that of Neil or Hugg was at the head of the column. Sullivan's attack was almost perfectly coordinated with Greene's in point of time. An enemy Jaeger detachment of 50 men was quickly pushed into the village from their post in General Philemon Dickinson's house. Four pieces of American artillery entered Trenton by the river road at the head of Sullivan's column; two more were well up. All three of these two-gun batteries were in action very early in the fight in the lower part of Trenton.

This encounter was as short and almost as decisive as that at the top of the village.

The third Hessian regiment, with two guns, was driven out to the southeast and its two field pieces captured, apparently before they had fired a shot. The only bridge across the Assunpink, that at the foot of Queen Street, was soon in Continental hands.

Glover's infantry and one battery³⁴ of artillery went to the south side of the Assunpink over the bridge and took stations to hold the bridge. The three remaining batteries advanced through the village and were among the forces which finally encircled and forced the surrender of the third Hessian regiment; this came so rapidly, however, once the bridge was captured and held securely, that few rounds seem to have been fired.

The victory at Trenton was as complete as it was easy, so far as the fighting was concerned. Losses in the Continental Army had been trifling—not more than six or eight killed and wounded. Artillery fire had a tremendous amount to do with this. The Hessian force, of probably around 1,500, lost in excess of 120 killed and wounded and upwards of 1,000 prisoners. They were completely overawed and forced to surrender in large part because of the great preponderance of artillery against them. Their own six pieces were never properly brought into action at all. Four of them fired a few rounds while still within the village before being taken. The other two were able to retire with the third regiment from the lower village, but stuck fast in mud. All six pieces were captured before the infantry finally surrendered.

Washington's strategic plan before the battle of Trenton had been to have a fairly large Continental force cross the Delaware in four separate bodies. Actually, only one of these—that under his personal command—was able to cross at all, thanks to Knox's

³⁴Sargent's Battery; Stryker, p. 178.

direction and the maritime skill of Glover's Marblehead regiment. Even though he won the battle of Trenton with ease, Washington still was isolated on the New Jersey side of the river; he and the victorious army returned to Pennsylvania that evening. But the effect of the battle on the British was more than Washington anticipated. The British and Hessians retired from Bordentown, Burlington, and Mount Holly. Washington recrossed the river with practically his entire force. There was a good deal of maneuvering by both sides. Brigadier General Cadwalader of the Pennsylvania Militia, who had failed to make his assigned crossing on the 25th, was now particularly active. The British concentrated at Princeton in strong force by 1 January 1777. Under orders from Howe, Cornwallis abandoned his plans to return to England and rode down to take command of the troops gathered here. He spent the first night of the new year at Princeton. The Continental Army was known to be at Trenton.

THE GUNS AT PRINCETON

At dawn, the major part of the British force of 8,000 men and 28 pieces of artillery moved out towards Trenton. Their camp already extended in that direction as far as Eight Mile Run—eight miles from Trenton.

Those eight miles proved difficult. In addition to the miry roads, Washington had advanced a delaying force of perhaps 600 men and Forrest's two guns—the howitzers did not join in the action until it reached Trenton. This force did its work well in spite of certain defections. Though General DeFenoy left in such a hurry as to raise serious doubts as to his courage; the next in command, Colonel Hand of a Pennsylvania Rifle regiment, seems to have employed his riflemen and Forrest's two guns very skillfully indeed. They made the advancing army of Cornwallis go into battle formation at least

twice and held up their advance on several other occasions. The Pennsylvania riflemen from cover were deadly. The two guns, in addition to their actual fire on the long advancing columns, led the British commander to believe he was facing Washington's entire army.³⁵ On the outskirts of Trenton, there was a small earthwork held by infantry and four more field pieces. This force was also thrust back by the British. Cornwallis was, at last, face to face with the whole Continental Army, but the short winter afternoon was drawing to a close. The main American position was across the Assunpink; Continental detachments to the north had to run for it now, but almost every man and every gun made the bridge safely.

Washington's forces, concentrated at Trenton that morning, consisted of about 5,000 infantry and 40 pieces of artillery,³⁶ a ratio of eight pieces per 1,000 infantry. We know a good deal less of the organization and details of the artillery assembled on the heights south of the Assunpink than we do of the pieces that crossed the Delaware nine days before. A total of 22 pieces had probably been added. Some at least of these had been in battery organizations for some time. Cadwalader had with him, and was unable to bring across the river on Christmas night, two or three batteries. These consisted, during a part of his maneuvering between Crosswicks and Cranbury, of four iron 3-pounders and two brass 6-pounders.³⁷ Major Proctor brought a powerful battery of field artillery from Philadelphia which probably consisted of two or three brass French 4-pounders and

³⁵Bill, p. 86, summarizes this action well. See Alfred H. Bill, *The Campaign of Princeton* (Princeton, 1948).

³⁶Knox to Mrs. Knox, 7 January 1777; Knox says 30 or 40 pieces in action. History has assumed, not illogically, that Knox knew how many pieces he had, but not precisely how many went into action at this particular time; most later estimates, including those herein, are based on an initial 40 pieces less known withdrawals.

³⁷Stryker, p. 242.

an iron 3-pounder.³⁸ Washington had captured from the Hessians at Trenton six brass Hessian 3-pounders with all their equipment. Although these were eventually used in the Continental army,³⁹ it is not certain that they were used so soon. Some other pieces must also have been added.

Almost all the Continental guns opened fire on the British once they began to push through the village towards the Assunpink. Their fire and the aspect of the earthworks occupied by American infantry above the single bridge and two or three fords stopped the half-hearted attack in short order. The light was failing. Cornwallis went into camp for the night.

During his brief battle, Knox had marshalled and employed flawlessly a large battery of field guns, even though the number of infantry engaged was relatively small. This thunderous display was extremely beneficial to the American infantry which lacked discipline and training. At least half of Washington's army on 2 January 1777 was composed of recently joined militia. Inexperienced troops are always heartened by their own cannon and demoralized by the field pieces of the opposition. Knox was showing, at 26 years of age, his remarkable power for organizing and running a successful enterprise. He was choosing his artillery officers carefully and creating in the entire organization an *esprit de corps* unique in the army.

As complete darkness fell, the Continental batteries grew silent, save two howitzers with which Knox periodically threw shells into Trenton to prevent the British from enjoying an untroubled night's rest.⁴⁰

³⁸*Ibid.*, p. 257. When Proctor's battery maneuvered in New Jersey in October 1778 he had two 12-pounders; Adam Ferguson, *Memoir of Lt. Col. Patrick Ferguson* (Edinburgh, 1817), p. 37.

³⁹Baurmeister, p. 17.

⁴⁰Knox to Mrs. Knox, 7 January 1777; he specifically states "shells."

The situation of the Continental forces that night was extremely serious. Washington faced an army more numerous and infinitely better drilled and disciplined than his own. His front on the heights above the Assunpink was very strong. His left flank rested on the Delaware and was, therefore, completely safe; however, his right flank was in the air. A flanking movement by the British to their left could not be defeated with the force in hand. To be pinned against the Delaware would be fatal. Washington could not possibly cross it here in the face of an enemy. Retreat further down the left bank of the river would lead to probable annihilation. The Delaware was wider and deeper below Trenton. Southern Jersey becomes a peninsula between the Delaware and the Atlantic. It would have made an almost perfect cul-de-sac. However, Washington had no intention of retreating. He called a council of war. With the consummate diplomacy he used throughout the war, he allowed someone else to propose the idea, even though it had obviously been in his mind. By a night march, the Continental forces moved to their own right around the left wing of Cornwallis' army; they marched towards Princeton in the British rear.

Some 400 men and the two howitzers were left in the abandoned Continental position.⁴¹ Fires were kept up; shovels and picks were used noisily. At intervals a shell would describe a high arc in the air with fuse burning and explode where it fell.⁴² Meanwhile the main force of about 4,500 men and 35 pieces of artillery were moving towards their destiny at Princeton. There had been a sharp freeze; the back roads were passable. Gun-carriage wheels were muffled in rags and

⁴¹Stryker quotes "Officer of Distinction," p. 446, in letter from Pluckemin, 5 January 1777.

⁴²The standard howitzer carriages had removable bed plates between the cheek pieces so that the breech could be dropped down to give mortar-type fire, if desired; see Muller diagrams and explanatory text.

rope. The baggage and three heavy field guns, probably 12-pounders or French 8-pounders, were sent to Bordentown and Burlington.⁴³ The army arrived at the Quaker Meeting House a mile and a half outside Princeton just after sunrise on 3 January 1777. The British forces in Princeton consisted of three infantry regiments—the 17th, 40th, and 55th Foot—and probably three companies of Light Dragoons, at least partially dismounted.⁴⁴ There were about 1,200 in all. About two-thirds of these had moved out at sunrise to reinforce Cornwallis at Trenton and had crossed Stony Brook. When they saw the American forces, they recrossed and attacked.

The Continental army had divided at the Quaker Meeting House; a part going in to Princeton directly by the back road, and another part, under General Mercer, moving towards the Post Road to destroy the bridge over the brook to delay Cornwallis whose pursuit was anticipated as soon as daylight revealed the deception.

Mercer's brigade collided with the British force which had counter-marched back across the bridge. This meeting took place in an orchard surrounded by open fields between Stony Brook and the little village of Princeton. Mercer's command included Captain Daniel Neil's battery of two iron 3-pounders; this was the Eastern Company of the New Jersey State Artillery, already in action at

Trenton. The British force also had two guns, brass 6-pounders, manned by Royal Artillerymen, perhaps mounted in Galloper carriages.⁴⁵

These two batteries faced each other, both to the southwest of the infantry they supported. However, apparently, both fired into the opposing infantry, rather than at each other. The British infantry broke Mercer's line so quickly and so completely that both Neil's pieces were captured and Neil himself killed. He received praise from Knox and others as an able artilleryman. He fired probably three or four rounds of grape into the British line before his pieces were captured.

In this first encounter, the compact force of British regulars had been completely successful. Mercer's brigade was in flight and he himself mortally wounded. The Royal Artillerymen, with aid from the infantry, took over the handling of the captured guns also. To make matters worse, Cadwalader's militia were arriving on the scene in column and were infected with the panic of Mercer's Continentals as they tried to form into line. The British fire, both from the four field pieces and the muskets of the infantry, seemed very heavy.

At this juncture, Moulder's battery came up. This was the second company of the Philadelphia Associator's Artillery—Philadelphia Militia—armed with three long French 4-pounders. One of these seems to have been captured; however, the other two went into action to the right of the Thomas Clarke house and were exposed to the entire fire of British artillery and infantry. These gunners, artisans, sailors, and dock workers in civilian life, withstood the challenge manfully and practically alone stopped the advance of the British sufficiently to allow

⁴³Everyone seems to agree on the number and that they were "heavy"; probably, they were just heavy field guns, though they could have been siege pieces. See n. 38; possibly 12-pounders.

⁴⁴These Light Dragoons have been variously stated to be mounted and dismounted; Diary of Captain Thomas Rodney, *Delaware Historical Society Papers* (Wilmington, 1879), vol. 1, part VIII, p. 34, states a part at least to be mounted; so does Stryker's "Officer of Distinction." Sergeant R., in his manuscript account of the battle now in the Princeton University Library has 50, at least, dismounted. The matter is further complicated by original references giving the regiment as both the 16th Light Dragoons and the 17th Light Dragoons; both were in America at the time, and were consolidated into a single regiment later.

⁴⁵Original references state from two to eight. Both Washington and Knox agree on two—brass 6-pounders—but Rodney states eight; Ward has followed the latter.

Washington, Greene, Cadwalader, and others to stem the panic.⁴⁶ With their fire, they broke an attempt to flank the American position by a group of mounted Light Dragoons.⁴⁷

The far more numerous Continental Army recovered quickly from its initial discomfiture; Washington's heroic example brought both Continentals and Militia to a stand and turned them back against the foe. Hitchcock's Continentals arrived; unit after unit took its place in the American line which enveloped, overwhelmed, and finally shattered the British. Probably other batteries were in action briefly, but of this no record survives. The British 17th Foot and a part of the 55th were superb, even in defeat; however, they were definitely and completely routed within an incredibly short time. The Royal Artillery detachment is said to have suffered 100% killed and wounded.⁴⁸ Neil's guns were retaken along with the two British 6-pounders.

Meanwhile, Sullivan's Division was inactive facing the major portion of the British 55th and all the 40th. As soon as the western fight was over, Sullivan launched an attack which carried his division into Princeton, practically without firing a shot. There were undoubtedly several batteries with this column; however, no record of their services remains.⁴⁹ The British retreated towards Kingston and Rocky Hill.

Princeton had been one of a series of British posts across New Jersey. The British had been using the principal houses in the village for their quarters. Nassau Hall, then only

twenty years old, was by far the largest and most imposing building in the village. A number of Whig prisoners had been confined there; apparently, there were also some wounded British soldiers quartered there. Some of the retreating British from the 40th and 55th regiments took refuge in the place, believing perhaps that it might be held. However, the building was almost immediately enveloped by the Continental army. Alexander Hamilton's battery of two brass 6-pounders arrived and fired three rounds into the building.⁵⁰ One round went through the large window of the Prayer Hall, now the Faculty Room, and across this room to decapitate the painting of George II. A second round hit the solid south wall of the west wing of the building high up between the first and second windows from the Prayer Hall on the second floor above ground and rebounded, narrowly missing a field officer and his horse.⁵¹ The scar of this shot has been preserved in all the various repointing and rebuildings of Nassau Hall since then and is visible today. A third shot went through an upper window and interior partitions. Surrender of the British force came quickly; some authorities place the number captured as high as 194.

Hamilton's pieces were undoubtedly placed just out of musket shot. From the above details it would appear that the position of the pieces at the time of discharge was about where the first entry of Blair Hall is now. The guns had probably been loaded in the little valley then existing to the south of this point and manhandled up the hill by their crews.⁵²

⁴⁶Rodney, p. 34, and others.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, p. 35. See also n. 44 above.

⁴⁸Casualties vary widely; Christopher Ward, *The War of the Revolution*, p. 316, quotes Howe's report of 18 killed as not including 10 artillerymen killed. Since there would have been only about 20 to 30 to handle two 6-pounder Gallopers, the remainder may easily have been wounded or captured.

⁴⁹According to Sullivan, the British here made little resistance, "owing to the manner of the attack"; Bill states, p. 112, that it was probably a flank movement to the south, in which I concur.

⁵⁰V. Lansing Collins, *President Witherspoon* (Princeton, 1952) II, 95.

⁵¹Ward, p. 315.

⁵²Wilkinson, pp. 144-45, states the firing to have taken place after the surrender of the British in Nassau Hall. George O. Trevelyan, *The American Revolution*, II, 137, states the shots to have been the "irreverence of a student fresh from a rival place of education"; it is unlikely, however, that Aaron Burr, a Princetonian, had this solely in mind when he shot the Columbia man 27½ years later.

Washington attacked along the back road into Princeton because the British had fortified the village to the southwest, towards both Trenton and McConkey's Ferry, where Washington had crossed the Delaware three times within ten days. There were several field pieces in these fortifications. Unfortunately, no record of their number, or exact designation, survives; however, there were probably six pieces divided between small earthworks at (1) the head of Nassau Street where Stockton Street and Bayard Lane come into it at the present time,⁵³ at (2) the intersection of Nassau Street and Witherspoon Street, and perhaps (3) about where Washington Road enters Nassau Street now.⁵⁴ These pieces as well as some other stores in Princeton were taken by the Americans. There were insufficient horses, however, to carry the artillery pieces away, although Proctor exchanged an iron 3-pounder for a British brass 6-pounder.⁵⁵

Washington was able to occupy Princeton for about two hours. Cornwallis had awakened to the sound of guns to his rear. He then moved back towards Princeton in hot haste. Meanwhile, Washington was on his way to Kingston and New Brunswick, leaving only a small detachment of infantry and Forrest's battery of artillery to contest the crossing of Stony Brook below Worth's Mill. The British arrived before the bridge was completely demolished and opened fire with their artillery. Forrest's guns returned this fire. After a minor action, the Continental forces

retreated to Princeton and, almost immediately, towards Kingston.

However, the British forces by this time were considerably sobered by the sight of a battlefield where they had obviously lost. Someone in Princeton, probably a militiaman not on active duty, fired the howitzer already referred to from the fortification at the head of Nassau Street at the advancing British. The advance guard stopped, threw out skirmishers to either flank and waited for reinforcements.

After a considerable delay, the British came on again and advanced towards Kingston. The Continentals had torn up the bridge over the Millstone and posted Moulder's battery at the top of the hill with instructions to engage the enemy and then abandon its guns if necessary. These pieces, which had been so important in the fighting earlier in the day, now fired the shots which closed the campaign from the top of the Kingston hill. After a spirited cannonade, the gunners dragged their pieces to safety, limbered up, and were off towards Morristown.⁵⁶

As I write these lines, I see below me the route taken from Princeton to Kingston. The Kingston hill rises opposite; the way to Morristown stretches off to the left. A canister shot, just recovered from in front of Moulder's last position, rests on my desk. One feels a sense of solemn appreciation for what Washington and his small army accomplished: field guns were never better employed.

They reached their Morristown encampments safely. The entire course of the war had been changed. Knox and his gunners had contributed mightily, not only to two small victories, but also to the making of an army and a nation.

⁵³A mound of earth long preserved in this area now the residence of Mrs. Edgar Palmer at 2 Bayard Lane may easily be the remains of this early redoubt.

⁵⁴The variation between eyewitnesses — Rodney, Sergeant R., "An Officer of Distinction" as well as Washington, Knox, and Wilkinson — as to the guns captured in the battle may be explained in this way. They may have all seen the two pieces in the action to the west and then seen a part or all these in the fortifications.

⁵⁵Stryker, p. 446.

⁵⁶Accounts differ as to where this last action took place; it may have been on the west side of the Millstone. Moulder was brought before a court-martial for exposing his gunners, but cleared; Bill, pp. 118-19.

BRITISH-FRENCH AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN THE SEA OF AZOV, 1855

BY JAMES M. MERRILL*

It was spring, 1855. On the outskirts of Paris the war in the distant Crimea did not deter the painters and carpenters who, cursing the rain, feverishly doctored ornate trappings in preparation for the opening of the Universal Exhibition. Across town at the Tuileries Napoleon III smoked, meditated, and pondered his maps. Suddenly, the Emperor snatched paper and pen, scribbled off a message, and called for his aide. An hour later in the Parisian military headquarters, an obscure telegraph operator drummed out the official dispatch. Fourteen hundred miles away in the Crimea the Emperor's telegram interrupted the sleep of General Francois Canrobert, commander-in-chief of the French field forces before the Russian-held city of Sevastopol. Annoyed when awakened at 10:00 P.M. and handed the dispatch, the general, who had suffered the past week with gout and was in "shattered health," stumbled from his cot, dressed slowly, and waddled over to a British tent, where he roused Lord Raglan, his English counterpart. Outside the guns rumbled at the front. At 1:00 A.M. the following morning Canrobert walked

slowly back to his headquarters; at 2:15 A.M., after receipt of a second Paris dispatch, he was back in Raglan's tent.¹ Here, the drama that had been taking shape was perverted into a farce. The combined British-French expedition against the Strait of Kerch, which had sailed 10 hours previously, was recalled. Raglan bristled; Canrobert's "shattered health" worsened.

The year before after England and France declared war on Russia, their armies moved into the Black Sea area and, after much delay, confusion, and maneuvering, arrived on 13 September 1854 at a point on the Crimean Peninsula just north of Sevastopol. The strategy was to capture Sevastopol, a city which symbolized Russian military pride and that nation's aggression against Turkey. Its conquest would protect the Turks in Asia and humiliate the Tsar.

A week after the landing in the Crimea allied British and French field forces, which were slowly marching southward toward their objective, routed the main Russian army, at Alma, driving it back in disorder. But indecision caused the allied advance to sputter

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¹Raglan to Lyons, before Sevastopol, 4 May 1855, in Great Britain, Admiralty, *Russian War, 1855. Black Sea. Official Correspondence* (London, 1945), pp. 145-46, no. 14/68. (Hereafter cited as *Black Sea*.)

and stall. If the advantage had been pressed, Sevastopol, home of the Russian Black Sea Squadron, might have been taken and the Russian Army destroyed in one grand stroke. This hesitation permitted the Tsar's forces to re-group, and thus the opportunity to end the war quickly evaporated. For strategic purposes the British and French armies moved south of Sevastopol to Kamiesch and Balaclava. Having set up permanent encampments in this area by late September 1854, they commenced the siege of this city, which the Tsar had pledged himself to defend to the last arsenal.

To nullify British naval power, Russian sailors already had sealed up the mouth of Sevastopol Harbor with scuttled vessels, thus permitting the guns of the Russian ships inside the harbor to aid the city's defenders. This stratagem also had the more important effect of rendering the allied naval units, which completely controlled the Black Sea, impotent in co-operating with the field command in forcing entry to Sevastopol. A few British ships were useful in blockading merchantmen in neighboring Black Sea ports, but the major portion of the fleet rode stagnant at anchor before the embattled city.² "Perfect inaction," a naval officer called it.³

Although the allies had numerical superiority on land and sea, the siege was ineffective. The Russian garrison in the city, penned a British general in his journal, "was never besieged in the sense of being closely invested."⁴ To the north of Sevastopol several roads leading eastward to the Sea of Azov and the Russian interior were open,

and recruits, field equipment, and foodstuffs arrived regularly behind the city's defenses. Except for two attempts by the entrapped Russian soldiers to slug their way out and break the siege, there was no movement, and the armies sat idle during the winter of 1854.

In their tents allied commanders, wary of defeat and heavy casualties, pussyfooted about forward movements. Outside in the camp a visiting correspondent was assailed by the powerful odor, compounded of urine, stale cooking, and disease.⁵ Plagued by frost-bite, fever, diarrhea, dysentery, and cholera, soldiers glutted ill-equipped field hospitals and, if there had been no reinforcements arriving, the British Army would soon have disintegrated. An English artilleryman wrote home the "troops . . . are still hard worked, and bitterly weary of the whole business. There is no confidence in the commanders. . . ."⁶ Something "like a mutinous spirit" existed in the French camp.⁷ Winter passed into spring. A young officer lamented: the men lead "a regular drony life . . . drony so far as that there . . . [is] no change, our only recreation being to rub our mosquito bites, to torment flies, and to bury the dead."⁸

The pervading atmosphere in London was overcast. News from the front was "monotonous and discouraging." Why didn't the army move? Why had the navy done nothing? Men talked in terms of blunders, confusion, and inefficiency. One British lord dubbed the expedition "a grand mistake," and a newspaper editor howled: "The light of hope does not rest on the [Crimean] picture. Progress, indeed, there is none."⁹ Recruiting drooped; a Foreign Enlistment

²See W. F. Reddaway, "The Crimean War and the French Alliance, 1853-1858," *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1783-1919* (New York, 1923), II, 383; and E. L. Woodward, *The Age of Reform, 1815-1870* (Oxford, 1938), pp. 254-77.

³Stewart to Panmure, off Kazatch, 7 May 1855, in Sir George Douglas & Sir George Dalehouse Ramsay, eds., *The Panmure Papers* . . . (London, 1908), I, 187.

⁴Sir Harry Jones, *Journal of the Siege* (London, n.d.), p. 11.

⁵*The Times*, 18 May 1855.

⁶*Ibid.*, 30 May 1855.

⁷*Ibid.*, 22 May 1855.

⁸Pepper to Oldstage, before Sevastopol, — July 1855, in Ensign Thomas Pepper, "Ensign Pepper's Letters from the Crimea," *The New Monthly Magazine*, CV (1855), 34.

⁹*The Times*, 16, 18 May 1855; and *The Illustrated London News*, 12 May 1855, p. 470.

Act passed; the opposition's drums beat; the Aberdeen Ministry resigned. To investigate the alleged sufferings of British troops, a parliamentary committee was formed, which, after compiling much evidence, concluded that the "State of our army . . . was one of almost unparalleled hardship, privation, and suffering."¹⁰

What were the military doing? Plans were underway in the Crimea to rectify the situation. Naval and military men focused their attention on the destruction of Sevastopol's main lateral supply line, which stretched eastward across the Crimean Peninsula to the Russian town of Kerch on the Sea of Azov. If the flow of material through this artery could be pinched off and the gain and equipment depots along the inland sea devastated, the Russian Army would face starvation and ammunition shortages. The investment of Sevastopol would be complete.

The Sea of Azov, considered by the British as of the "highest strategical importance," was, as one sailor termed it, a vast treasure-house, crammed with wealth of inestimable value. For miles along its shores stretched the countless storehouses packed with accumulated harvests of the great corn provinces of Russia.¹¹

Emptying into the northern part of the Sea, the Don River was necessary to communications with the Russian interior and to connect the produce of the Don Valley and resources of the Volga with the embattled city of Sevastopol. Merchant ships were the next link in the supply line, transporting cargo from the commercial ports of the Sea of Azov to Kerch.

Heavily fortified with a garrison of 9,000, this important supply center commanded the approaches of the Strait leading from the Black Sea into the Sea of Azov, while a few

miles northward, guns of the fishing town of Yenikale strengthened the control.¹² Unloaded at Kerch, provisions and equipment were packed into wagons for transshipment to the Russian Army at Sevastopol. A secret agent estimated that 1,500 wagons stuffed with grain headed westward daily for the beleaguered city.¹³ It is obvious that the Azov Sea and the allied occupation of Kerch would be of the greatest importance for the Crimean campaign, or, as one observer concluded, "of more importance as to the general issue of the war than killing 1000 men."¹⁴

When, in October 1854, the Admiralty suggested to the commander of the Black Sea Squadron that "proper measures should be concerted" to enter the Sea of Azov, embryonic plans took form for a combined British-French offensive against Kerch.¹⁵ The squadron's commander retorted that he was "fully aware of the value" of such a thrust and, to explain why the enterprise had not been undertaken, blamed the British generals for lack of co-operation.¹⁶ Prodded for a "decided success" from London, the military men in the Crimea promptly dumped the responsibility for the stalemate on the French.¹⁷ Plans were shelved for the winter.

¹²See Bentley's *Miscellany*, XXXIX (1856), 594; *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, LXXVIII (1855), 521-32; and E. H. Nolan, *The Illustrated History of the War against Russia* (London, 1857), II, 337. Also see Colburn's *United Service Magazine and Naval and Military Journal*, Pt. 2 (1855), pp. 563-71. (Hereafter cited as Colburn's.)

¹³Lyons to Admiralty, off Kerch, 2 June 1855, *Black Sea*, p. 175, no. 87.

¹⁴Nolan, *op. cit.*, pp. 347-49. For naval and military strategy, see Admiralty to Lyons, [London], 19 February 1855, *Black Sea*, pp. 73-74, no. 23. For a description of the Sea of Azov, see *The Nautical Magazine and Naval Chronicle*, XXIV (1815), 225-28.

¹⁵Admiralty to Dundas, [London], 13 October 1854, in Great Britain, Admiralty, *Russian War, 1854. Baltic and Black Sea. Official Correspondence* (London, 1943), p. 337, no. 67.

¹⁶Dundas to Admiralty, off Katscha, 27 October 1854, *ibid.*, p. 351, no. 75.

¹⁷Houston to Panmure, off Sevastopol, 21 April 1855, in Douglas & Ramsay, *op. cit.*, I, 161-62; and Brown's memorandum, before Sevastopol, 30 April 1855, *Black Sea*, pp. 119-20, no. 58.

¹⁰*The Times*, 22 June 1855.

¹¹Quoted in William Laird Clowes, *The Royal Navy. A History from the Earliest Times to the Present* (London, 1901), VI, 454.

To bolster the sagging morale, British and French ships foraged the coast near Kerch. Valuable not only in harassing the enemy, these allied steamers gathered, shifted, and sent off intelligence as to the enemy's movements and the location of batteries. The situation, however, was muddled when other information dribbled into allied hands. A Dutchman reported nearly four fathoms in the mid-channel of Kerch Strait; a British officer had learned that "infernal machines," a pile drive, and other obstacles clogged the entrance; a Turkish spy whispered that in addition to sunken vessels "heaps of stores and piles of timber" had been unloaded into the small inlet.¹⁸ Efforts to sketch out a battle plan amid this jungle of rumor were further complicated by accusers at home, who were berating the commanders in the Crimea for indecisiveness. The Admiralty reminded its naval officers: "It is of the last importance that this communication should be cut off with the least possible delay. . . . The importance of this matter cannot be too strongly impressed on you."¹⁹ Lord Panmure, Secretary for War, scolded Raglan: "Had this been done last year, what a host of supplies would have been cut off from the Russian Army!" A "coup there [at Kerch], and . . . [the] possession of the Sea of Azof," threatened the secretary, "I throw it out as a hint. . . ."²⁰

To Admiral Edmund Lyons, who assumed command of the British naval units in the Black Sea in late winter 1854, must go the credit for the actual involvement and eventual sailing of the Kerch expedition. Through his pleadings and wranglings definite plans were

molded for the combined British-French assault at Kerch, for the occupation of the city, and for the destruction by naval units of other ports along the Sea of Azov. "The season is approaching," Lyons advised the Admiralty, "when operations in the Sea of Azoff may be undertaken, on which . . . the complete success of the Crimean expedition depends in no small degree." The barriers in the Strait, he added, after digesting the latest reports, "no longer exist," and a flotilla of light draft vessels could "hardly fail to render good service."²¹ His scheme worked out in detail, Lyons acted.

With the commander of the French naval forces, Admiral Bruat, whom Lyons had converted to his ideas, the British naval chief went ashore in March 1855 at military headquarters near Sevastopol. His object was to transform the generals' timidity into vigorous action. To soothe the fears of the army men, who fretted over dwindling manpower, Lyons promised that the field contingent, if assigned, would return to allied encampments within ten days. Buttressed with facts and figures, the naval commander pleaded and begged for cooperation, and argued that such an attack would "contribute to the . . . [enemy's] discomfiture." Raglan and Canrobert, commanders of the allied field forces, vacillated and hedged.²²

A month slipped by. By this time Raglan had become Lyons' disciple, and began bullying the French. But at a conference at British headquarters in early April, Canrobert wrung his hands and sulked: "It is at Sevastopol, not at Kerch, "that the fate of the campaign . . . [is] to be settled." If the allies are successful here, Kerch and "everything else will fall as a matter of course." The French would not budge until rein-

¹⁸Giffard to Lyons, off Kerch, 13 February 1855, *Black Sea*, p. 78, no. 30; Moore to Lyons, on board *Highflyer*, 26 April 1855, *ibid.*, p. 131, no. 5/64; and W. H. Russell, *The War: From the Landing at Gallipoli to the Death of Lord Raglan* (London, 1855), p. 453.

¹⁹Admiralty to Lyons, [London], 19 February 1855, *Black Sea*, pp. 73-74, no. 23.

²⁰Panmure to Raglan, [London], 26 February, 9 March 1855, in Douglas & Ramsay, *op. cit.*, I, 79, 101, respectively.

²¹Lyons to Admiralty, off Sevastopol, 4 March 1855, *Black Sea*, pp. 92-93, no. 39.

²²*Idem.* to *Idem.*, off Sevastopol, 13 March 1855, *ibid.*, p. 99, no. 42.

forced by 40,000 recruits.²³

After receiving the promise of fresh troops, Canrobert surrendered to the pleas of Lyons and Raglan in late April 1885. Plans for the Kerch expedition were carefully mapped out in the "utmost secrecy" and hastily shipped off to London and Paris for approval.²⁴ The action signal was given; the battle flag run up.

The preparations for the "secret" expedition, which completely absorbed the gossip of the allied camps, worked a miracle of military transformation. When definite news came, the hang dog look of the soldiers vanished. Nothing, confided a London *Times* correspondent, "could exceed the joy of the soldiers of both armies." The "French were delighted" to desert their "unhealthy quarters," while to the east the mud-caked and disgusted Britishers "considered it a regular God-send to be conducted to some other spot." Out to sea sailors, whose idleness was still more complete, cheered, huzzahed, and exulted "in joy and hope."²⁵

To the south side of Sevastopol at Kamiesch Bay, during the twilight hours of 3 May 1885, 11,000 troops, 8,500 French, 2,500 British, trudged up the gangway to waiting transports.²⁶ At 8:00 P.M. the convoy, escorted by six men-of-war, weighed anchor and headed southeastward. On shore a Turkish newspaperman queried: "Where is it going?"²⁷ Not even the allied high command foresaw the answer.

And it was at 10:00 P.M. that very same night that General Canrobert, commander of

the French field forces, was awakened and handed a dispatch from Napoleon III which sent him hurrying over to Lord Raglan's tent. Contained in the message were some details of a grandiose scheme with which the Emperor hoped to wrap up the Crimean campaign in a month. Having read this dispatch, Raglan termed it an "extraordinary document," "wild and impracticable," "very complicated," and counseled, argued, and finally sent the Frenchman back to his camp. The bomb burst two hours later. Canrobert, visibly shaken, rushed into Raglan's tent, waved a second telegram, stuttered, and then blurted out that he had recalled the French part of the Kerch expedition! Aghast, Raglan berated the Frenchman. But Napoleon had ordered Canrobert "to concentrate immediately" his forces, and the French general, who had made every ludicrous mistake possible, was immovable.²⁸ Off to the south of Kamiesch Bay, a dispatch boat with Canrobert's recall orders on board was already ploughing the Black Sea to head off the allied convoy.

Near the rendezvous point off Kerch, Canrobert's messenger climbed on board the British flagship *Royal Albert* in the early morning hours of 4 May. Here, with a different set of props and characters, the Sevastopol tent scene was re-enacted. Lyons employed the line, "If . . . I were [you]," and French Admiral Bruat reiterated: "It is . . . [my] duty to obey."²⁹ The transports were stopped. A Lyons' aide explained that the British admiral "exhausted every possible effort of reason and persuasion to induce . . . Bruat to go on. . . . I thought Lyons would have gone mad almost." Indeed, "it was heartbreaking. . . ." Left without French support,

²³Brown's memorandum, before Sevastopol, 30 April 1885, *ibid.*, pp. 140-41, no. 6/68. Also see Lyons to Admiralty, off Sevastopol, 3, 17 April 1885, *ibid.*, pp. 111-12, 119, nos. 49, 58, respectively.

²⁴*The Times*, 24 May 1885.

²⁵*Ibid.*, 18, 23, 24 May 1885. Also see Pepper to Oldstage, before Sevastopol, — July 1885, in Pepper, *op. cit.*, CV (1885), 34.

²⁶*Black Sea*, p. 12.

²⁷Constantinople *La Presse d'Orient*, 2 May 1885, quoted in *The Times*, 19 May 1885.

²⁸Raglan to Lyons, before Sevastopol, 4 May 1885, *Black Sea*, pp. 145-46, no. 14/68. Also see Canrobert to Bruat, [before Sevastopol], 4 May 1885, *ibid.*, p. 145, no. 13/68.

²⁹Lyons to Admiralty, off Sevastopol, 8 May 1885, *ibid.*, pp. 133-35, no. 68.

Lyons, "looking very glum," ordered his ships around and followed the French wake back to Sevastopol.³⁰

Repercussions were deafening. British officers and correspondents in the Crimea thumbed dictionaries for their verbal ammunition. Canrobert squirmed under the barrage of adjectives: "utterly unfit," "unimaginable," "spiritless." All the confidence "in his abilities has faded away in this quarter of the world," blistered an officer. "I blush to think," he added, "of what is likely to be thought of our consistency or firmness of purpose by the Russians after this display!"³¹ Raglan spoke of "vast disappointment."³²

For the enlisted men this was an infuriating period of readjustment to their old camps, the very sight of which "inspired disgust." The soldiers, whose irritation, commented a reporter, is expressed "in no very measured terms," groaned, gloomed, and circulated dirty jokes about the French general.³³ Out at sea Lyons was ill from "chagrin," but his aide well described the situation on board the ships: "Here we are in perfect inaction, and mortified beyond expression. . . ."³⁴

There were rumblings throughout Europe.

³⁰Stewart to Panmure, off Kuzatch, 7 May 1855, in Douglas & Ramsay, *op. cit.*, I, 186-87. For the recall of the first Kerch expedition, also see Russell, *op. cit.*, pp. 434-35; General Charles Fay, *Souvenirs de la Guerre de Crimée, 1845-1855* (Paris, 1889), pp. 214-15; and *The Gentleman's Magazine and Historical Review*, XLIII (1855), p. 633.

³¹Stewart to Panmure, off Kazatch, 7 May 1855, in Douglas & Ramsay, *op. cit.*, I, 187-88. Also see Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 435; Roden to —, Balaclava, 7 May 1855, in Countess of Airlee, ed., *With the Guards We Shall Go: A Guardsman's Letters in the Crimea, 1854-1855* (London, 1933), p. 272; Surgeon Charles Ricketts, "Adventures at the Taking of Kertch," *Colburn's*, Pt. 2 (1855), p. 533; and Stirling's Journal, 7 May 1855, in Lt. Col. Anthony Stirling, *The Story of the Highland Brigade in the Crimea* . . . (London, 1897), pp. 247-48.

³²Raglan to Panmure, before Sevastopol, 8 May 1855, in Douglas & Ramsay, *op. cit.*, I, 189.

³³*The Times*, 21, 23, 24 May 1855; and Nolan, *op. cit.*, II, 277.

³⁴Stewart to Panmure, off Kazatch, 7 May 1855, in Douglas & Ramsay, *op. cit.*, I, 187.

London was the center of the quake. More adjectives were loaded into long-range artillery and salvoed at Canrobert; newspapers howled and published letters from the Crimea "full of complaints"; officials teetered under the impact of public opinion. Queen Victoria was alarmed about the "bad feeling amongst many of . . . [the] officers and men."³⁵ In the Crimea Canrobert resigned because of "enfeebled health."³⁶

Developments were swift. Spurred by the new French commander, Jean-Jacques Pelissier, and by a Napoleonic dispatch stating, "I don't pretend to command the army from here [Paris]," and by Lyons who, upon receipt of new intelligence, was anxious to act, a blueprint was worked out for a second try at Kerch.³⁷ British patrol crafts off the Strait relayed information that the Russians were enlarging their fortifications and, read one report, "everyday adds to the accumulation of impediments that are being placed in the deep water channel."³⁸ If the expedition is renewed quickly, the British admiral urged superiors on 7 May, "I think success will be certain."³⁹

At 5:00 P.M., 22 May, in a remote corner of the French encampment, a soldier sat writing a letter home: "We are on the eve of great events. . . . The enthusiasm of the

³⁵Queen Victoria to Clarendon, Buckingham Palace, 10 May 1855, in Arthur C. Benson & Viscount Esher, eds., *The Letters of Queen Victoria . . . between . . . 1837 and 1861* (London, 1907), III, 160. Also see Panmure to Raglan, [London], 7 May 1855, in Douglas & Ramsay, *op. cit.*, I, 183-84; and Palmerston to Panmure, [London], 8 May 1855, *ibid.*, I, 190.

³⁶Canrobert to Foreign Office, [before Sevastopol], 16 May 1855, in Nolan, *op. cit.*, II, 280; and Canrobert to Napoleon III, [before Sevastopol], 19 May 1855, *ibid.*, II, 280-81.

³⁷*The Times*, 7 June 1855; Napoleon III to Pelissier, [Paris], n. d., quoted in Sir Edward Hamley, *The War in the Crimea* (London, 1910), p. 236; and Lyons to Admiralty, [off Sevastopol], 7 May 1855, *Black Sea*, p. 132, no. 66.

³⁸Osborn to Lyons, off Kerch, 18 May 1855, *Black Sea*, pp. 153-154, no. 7/73.

³⁹Lyons to Admiralty, [off Sevastopol], 7 May 1855, *ibid.*, p. 132, no. 66.

troops is difficult to describe."⁴⁰ At 5:00 P.M., 23 May, loaded with 16,000 British, French, Turkish, and Sardinian infantrymen, ordnance pieces, supplies, and mules, the transports, armed escorts, and a steam yacht, took departure from Kamiesch Bay and headed out to sea.⁴¹ Across Europe in Paris the French war minister huffed: "This news . . . is a great trouble. What generals and admirals, not one of them thought it his duty to consult the government of an affair of this importance!"⁴² In Osborne, England, Victoria jotted to a friend: "The Queen is in the greatest anxiety (though very confident) to hear the result of the new Kertch expedition."⁴³

The sun shone brightly in the Crimea on 24 May. On the balcony of Takli Light-house, near Kerch, ladies and their Russian escorts wondered at the group of ships nearing shore. In the meadow below a group of Cossacks galloped toward the city.⁴⁴ At Russian military headquarters a general issued a last dispatch.⁴⁵ Four miles out to sea allied transports bustled with activity — sailors ran up flags to celebrate the Queen's birthday; gunners hauled out ammunition and tinkered with their 32-pounders; soldiers readied themselves.

After much confusion and seven hours delay, infantrymen, field pieces, and mules were piled into waiting boats and headed toward the beach, several miles south of Kerch. There was no resistance. Ashore, with the French shouts of "*Vive l'empereur*" and the rumble of ships' guns in the background, the soldiers reformed and advanced.⁴⁶

Suddenly, exclaimed a shipboard reporter, "huge pillar[s] of white smoke rushed up towards the skies, opened like a gigantic balloon, and then a roar like the first burst of a thunder-storm, told us that a [Russian] magazine [at Kerch] had blown up."⁴⁷ More explosions. The noise "was most awful," observed a naval gunner.⁴⁸ Men from the ships could see in the distance Russian soldiers firing granaries and ammunition depots, and then retreating in disorder.

Inside Kerch was a hideous mess. Russian officials dumped the city's valuables into boats; soldiers pressed buttons, but the "cases of combustibles" sunk in the Strait's channel failed to go off. The wind and current against them, barques, schooners, and a mixture of small craft dammed up Kerch Harbor in a scramble to escape the allies. Seeing this impossible, sailors set fire to their ships. Several Russian cargo vessels, which were untangled in time, dashed out toward the Black Sea; and, as they cleared the Strait's entrance one by one, a gunboat "bowled down" and picked them off like clay ducks in a shooting gallery. To halt this, Russian guns roared out from Yenikale at the gunboat and "shot after shot splashed up the water." But with the aid of larger British and French vessels, which had arrived on the scene, the Yenikale batteries were silenced. Corn storehouses and supply installations in flames, Russians packed the main arteries leading out from Kerch and Yenikale.⁴⁹

336-37; and Lyons to Admiralty, off Kerch, 26 May 1855, *Black Sea*, p. 164, no. 79.

⁴⁷Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 448.

⁴⁸Ryan to —, — July 1855, on board *Curlew*, in Nolan, *op. cit.*, II, 387.

⁴⁹For the military and naval operations against Kerch, see *The Illustrated London News*, 2, 9, 23, 30 June 1855, pp. 538, 555-59, 632-40, 647, respectively; Bruat to Minister of Marine, off Kerch, 1 June 1855, quoted in *The Times*, 15 June 1855; *Idem to Idem*, off Kerch, 26 May 1855, quoted *ibid.*, 7 June 1855; D'Autemarre to Pelissier, Kerch, 28 May 1855, quoted *ibid.*, 14 June 1855; "Letter from a Sailor," [off Kerch], 26 May 1855, quoted *ibid.*, 15 June 1855; Lyons to Admiralty, off Kerch, 26 May 1855, *Black Sea*, p. 164,

⁴⁰*The Times*, 5 June 1855.

⁴¹Lyons to Admiralty, off Sevastopol, 22 May 1855 *Black Sea*, pp. 156-57, no. 75.

⁴²Vaillant to Niel, [Paris], n. d., in Hamley, *op. cit.*, p. 236.

⁴³Queen Victoria to Panmure, Osborne, 23 May 1855, m Douglas & Ramsay, *op. cit.*, I, 207.

⁴⁴Russell *op. cit.*, p. 448.

⁴⁵Wrangel to Gortschakov, Arguine, n. d., in Nolan, *op. cit.*, II 333-34.

⁴⁶Brown's report, Kerch, 25 May 1855, *ibid.*, II, pp

By nightfall, 24 May, the allied forces, which had progressed rapidly since the landing, occupied the evacuated city of Kerch "without striking a blow and almost without firing a shot."⁵⁰ At temporary headquarters officers scanned the day's balance sheet and learned that they had captured an estimated 2,500,000 pounds of burned corn, 250 oxen, two barges loaded with the "civil archives," 100 guns, 12,000 tons of coal of "utmost value," and a collection of boiler plates, uniforms, belts, anchors, copper nails, and bolts. Casualties included one wounded British soldier and three dead Russians.⁵¹ "Constant explosions," a correspondent gleefully told his readers,

shook the air, and single guns sounded here and there continuously throughout the night Here a ship lay blazing on a sandbank on the left, while a farmhouse in flames lighted up the sky on the right. . . . This was the Queen's birthday celebrated in the Crimea.⁵²

The Queen, however, would have seen hobgoblins that birthday night had she witnessed what followed. British, French, Turkish, and Sardinian soldiers, freed from the terrors of Sevastopol, ran amuck and sacked the city of Kerch and the neighboring villages. Before officers could check the pillaging, many "homesteads were reduced to ashes"; all public buildings destroyed; locks of "solid brass," hinges, and window fastenings were torn off; sofas, chairs, and "cushions of ottoman" in the governor's house were ripped up.⁵³ The streets of Kerch "resembled a fair." Some

infantrymen got drunk and held up parasols, others put on women's clothes and danced jigs, while in every direction men hurried away with bundles under their arms, with furniture on their backs, or staggered under a load of bedding down to the sea wall, where boats were laden "to the thwarts with plunder."⁵⁴

The nightmare ended. The next morning the troops were eager for further conquest and the march out of Kerch for Yenikale "was like a holiday affair" and "the spirit of the soldiery was exuberant." An hour later "the spirit of the soldiery" vanished. The sun was hot; the water, "scanty and foul"; the close-buttoned uniforms, "unbearable." The infantrymen were quickly revived when they straggled into vacated Yenikale and realized that there was still time for plunder. Here, the mania started all over again, but this time, it was stopped short by the stringent orders of the military and naval commanders. Destruction of enemy installations, however, continued unabated. The troops hurled guns into the sea, tore up platforms, and exploded magazines, while boat parties scurried "in all directions" to fire the Russian boats, storehouses, and huts.⁵⁵ That night on board the *Royal Albert* off Kerch, Admiral Lyons purred that the successful occupation of Kerch and Yenikale leaves "us masters of the entrance to the Sea of Azoff, without any casualties."⁵⁶

That same night a flotilla of British and French gunboats, commanded by Captain Edmund Lyons, the admiral's son, was operating in the Sea of Azov. Ordered "to de-

no. 79; *Id. to Id.*, off Kerch, 2 June 1855, *ibid.*, p. 175, no. 87; McKillop's report, off Kerch, 4 June 1855, in Nolan, *op. cit.*, II, 335; Brown's report, 25 May 1855, *ibid.*, II, 336-37; Roden to —, Balaclava, 27 May 1855, in Airle, *op. cit.*, pp. 280-89; Pepper to Oldstage, before Sevastopol, — July 1855, in Pepper, *op. cit.*, CV (1855), 34-6; and Ricketts, *op. cit.*, pp. 533-41.

⁵⁰Brown's report, 25 May 1855, in Nolan, *op. cit.*, II, 336.

⁵¹Lyons to Admiralty, off Kerch, 2 June 1855, *Black Sea*, p. 175, no. 87.

⁵²Bentley's *Miscellany*, XXXVIII (1855), 42-3.

⁵³Russell, *op. cit.*, p. 459.

⁵⁴For details on the sack of Kerch, see Ryan to —, on board *Curlew*, — July 1855, in Nolan, *op. cit.*, II, 388; *The Times*, 15 June 1855; *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, LXXVIII (1855), 268, 521-22; and John Codman, *An American Transport in the Crimean War* (New York, 1896), pp. 75-6.

⁵⁵Nolan, *op. cit.*, II, p. 332; Russell, *op. cit.*, pp. 452, 462; and *United Service Magazine*, 9 June 1855, quoted in *The Times*, 12 June 1855.

⁵⁶Lyons to Admiralty, in Sea of Azov, 25 May 1855, *Black Sea*, p. 158, no. 77.

stroy stores useful to the Russians," the young Lyons first headed his ships toward the eastern shore and the port of Berdiansk, which, next to Odessa, was "the largest corn emporium in southern Russia." Off this commercial port on 26 May the squadron anchored, boats were lowered, and seamen and marines pulled toward the beach under a covering fire from the ships' port batteries. Once ashore, the marauders burned a light-house and storage barns and left merchantmen ablaze in the harbor. Back on a ship that afternoon, a participant boasted in a letter: "We spared nothing at all. . . . We live like fighting cocks. I take my cutlass on shore with me, and kill pigs, sheep, ducks, geese, fowls, and every mortal thing I can put my hands upon."⁵⁷

With the granaries of Berdiansk canceled out, the squadron weighed anchor and, two days later, guns were hauled out and trained on the port town of Arabat. At 8:00 A.M. the men scurried into the waiting boats; at 8:15 A.M. they scurried back on board the ships. The enemy had decided to fight. Guns of the Russian fort boomed in defiance and a battle royal ensued, only to be ended when allied shells blew up an enemy magazine. Captain Lyons in his battle report estimated, perhaps exaggerating, that the "enemy must have lost many men from the precision with which the shells burst into his works. . . ."⁵⁸ Arabat's cannons silenced, the squadron commander ordered anchors hoisted and, at twilight, the flotilla chugged northward in the Sea of Azov. Below decks in a hammock a sailor described life in the British Navy.

I assure you, I have been up night and day for a week sometimes together, so a sailor's life is not the most easy. . . . Well, I am

very well and hearty; I can sing, smoke, dance, eat, drink, and work—there is no want of that . . . no more man-of-war life for me after this touch. It will be better bait than a biscuit that will catch me again.⁵⁹

But for this and other tars more biscuits and hard work lay ahead.

After pouncing upon unarmed merchantmen and executing a smash-and-run raid at the port of Genitchi,⁶⁰ the squadron, now reinforced by launches armed with howitzers, dropped anchor on 1 June off the large commercial town of Taganrog, located on the Sea of Azov at the mouth of the Don River. As Captain Lyons surveyed the scene from the bridge of his flagship, *Miranda*, he noted one stumblingblock—the water's shallowness prevented the larger ships from anchoring close enough to Taganrog for their guns to be effective. To overcome this disadvantage, seamen constructed a raft, loaded on her a 32-pounder, and christened her *Lady Nancy*. By 11:00 P.M., 2 June, preparations were completed and "all hands in the squadron [were] eager for the fight."⁶¹ Across the water in the evacuated city, 1,500 Russian soldiers waited.

At 2:00 A.M., 3 June, the British and French wrecking crews were routed out from their hammocks, and, having downed tea, climbed over the sides into the small boat armada, which included two light draft gunboats, *Recruit* and *Danube*, 12 armed launches, the raft *Lady Nancy*, and landing boats. The forward movement began. Fourteen hundred yards off shore the attack boats bobbed in the water and waited. When truce proposals were refused, guns and a "hurricane of rockets" flared from the *Recruit*, *Danube*, and launches, as the landing boats, towing

⁵⁷Ryan to —, on board *Curlaw*, — July 1855, in Nolan, *op. cit.*, II, 388. Also see Lyons to Lyons, off Arabat, 28 May 1855, *Black Sea*, pp. 171-73, no. 1/86.

⁵⁸Lyons to Lyons, off Arabat, 28 May 1855, *Black Sea*, pp. 171-73, no. 1/86.

⁵⁹Ryan to —, on board *Curlaw*, — July 1855, in Nolan, *op. cit.*, II, 388.

⁶⁰Lyons to Lyons, off Genitchi, 29 May 1855, *Black Sea*, pp. 173-75, no. 2/86.

⁶¹Anonymous diary, 3 June 1855, quoted in *The Times*, 25 June 1855.

the *Lady Nancy*, ran up on the beach. The enemy's rifle fire was heavy, but each attempt to save the storehouses lining the shore was repulsed by flames already started by the 32-pounder of the *Lady Nancy*. Off on the *Recruit*, a man penned:

When your blessed "Leviathan" couldn't come higher than

Three or four mile from the towns as you'd win;
Then in came our *Nancy*, as pat as your fancy,
And blow'd 'em to blazes as neat as a pin.⁶²

At military headquarters in Taganrog the Russian general cursed the "infernal cannonade" and growled: "There was one uninterrupted noise of shells bursting, fuses, and grape, accompanied by fire-rockets and rifle balls."⁶³

Engaged on the beach, three groups of allied sailors left their boats and scampered toward their objectives. Along the way, remembered a seaman, "I burned everything I could—in fact, anything that would catch fire I committed to flames."⁶⁴ Rows of granaries, stores of timber and tar, ships "on the stocks," the customs house, and, "unfortunately, but unavoidably," private property were ignited. One British seaman, looking at Taganrog, quipped: "many a Russian will go to his roost hungary-gutted this winter."⁶⁵ The destruction completed by 5:30 P.M., the attack force withdrew out to sea. At night, the scene, whooped a correspondent, "was glorious: on one side Taganrog in flames—on the other, ships burning, their masts falling with a crash, sending thousands of sparks into the air. . . . [This action] will spread the terror of the British navy beyond the confines of Europe. . . ."⁶⁶

⁶²Anonymous, "Jack and Nancy," *Punch*, 14 July 1855, p. 19.

⁶³Krosnov's report, in Nolan, *op. cit.*, II, 333-34.

⁶⁴Ryan to —, on board *Curlew*, — July 1855, *ibid.*, II, 388.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*

⁶⁶*The Illustrated London News*, 14 July 1855, p. 35. For details on the Taganrog operation, also see Lyons to Lyons, Taganrog Roads, 3 June 1855, *Black Sea*, pp. 179-82, no. 1/92.

After administering blows to three other coastal towns along the Azov Sea, Captain Lyons and his squadron set a course for Kerch.⁶⁷ A day later Admiral Lyons welcomed back the flotilla and wrote triumphantly: "The Sea of Azoff has been swept . . . and the enemy deprived not only of supplies which already existed in the different depots, but also of the means of transporting the coming crops."⁶⁸

A thousand miles to the northward at the palace in St. Petersburg, Tsar Alexander II prayed. Russian officials publicly maintained that the loss of Kerch was of "little importance," while the *Journal de St. Petersburg* bravely told readers that "the inglorious devastation . . . of some stores" had by no means exercised "the influence the enemy expected upon the general progress of war operations." But to play safe, the military called up reserve units of Cossacks to form a "part of the army to be immediately organized for the defense of the . . . empire." Russian official documents are not available but, according to allied newspapers, which printed private letters from Russia, excerpts from Slavic news journals, and information from Berlin correspondents, the loss to the ports along the Sea of Azov stunned the high echelons of the Tsar's government. Letters from the Russian capital, published in the *London Times*, told that the allied sorties had created astonishment, dismay, and "utmost indignation." The government was accused of negligence and inefficiency in the defense of its sea, which, said one letter, "was the last refuge of the commercial fleet of Southern Russia."⁶⁹ Tsar Alexander was not

⁶⁷See Lyons to Lyons, off Marianpol, 5 June 1855, *Black Sea*, p. 191, no. 1/98; *Id. to Id.*, off Geisk, 6 June 1855, *ibid.*, p. 192, no. 2/98; *Id. to Id.*, Kiten Bay, 10 June 1855, *ibid.*, pp. 192-193, no. 3/98; and Horton to Lyons, Kiten Bay, 10 June 1855, *ibid.*, p. 193, no. 4/98.

⁶⁸Lyons to Admiralty, Kerch, 12 June 1855, *ibid.*, p. 190, no. 98.

⁶⁹*The Illustrated London News*, 9 June 1855, p. 551; and *The Times*, 2, 5, 6, 9, 19, 21 June 1855.

playing with little lead soldiers—his Crimean army had to be fed.

The news of the Kerch victory, as it spread rapidly over Europe, jolted world capitals. In London Palmerston glowed: "This is capital news"; Clarendon, foreign secretary, exclaimed: "Heaven grant it be the forerunner of other successes"; an M.P. stated: Russia has "committed naval suicide."⁷⁰ In the House of Commons, the sound of the opposition's drums was drowned out.⁷¹

In Paris public attention focused on Kerch. A French general shouted jubilantly: "We have struck deep into the Russian resources. . . . Confidence is general."⁷² "Never," exclaimed a Parisian, "since the landing of the allied troops in the Crimea . . . has intelligence from the seat of war been more anxiously looked for than at this moment. . . ."⁷³ In Vienna "all eyes, all attention" shifted on the Sea of Azov; the "Austrian military world" attached "extreme importance" to the expedition; a member of the Russian embassy feared that the Kerch loss would seriously interfere with the Tsar's army.⁷⁴

On a parade ground in the Crimea to the south of Sevastopol, drums rolled, British soldiers lined up in formation, and a special order was read. News of the victory, described a correspondent, "was received by cheers such as only Englishmen know how to give. . . ."⁷⁵ Gloom and despondency, which had dogged the troops all winter, vanished. "These gallant exploits of the navy have spread joy in our camps, and afforded vast satisfaction to every individual in the army,"

⁷⁰Palmerston to Panmure, [London], 10 June 1855, in Douglas & Ramsay, *op. cit.*, I, 231; Clarendon to, Panmure, [London], 28 May 1855, *ibid.*, I, 216; and Molesworth, 4 June 1855, *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates* (London, 1855), CXXXVIII, Ser. 3, p. 1346.

⁷¹*The Times*, 29, 30 May 1855; and *The Illustrated London News*, 2 June 1855, p. 521.

⁷²Pelissier to Valliant, [before Sevastopol], n. d., in Hamley, *op. cit.*, p. 242.

⁷³*The Times*, 24 May 1855.

⁷⁴*Ibid.*, 2, 6, 9 June 1855.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, 13 June 1855.

applauded Raglan.⁷⁶ Further eastward in the French camp "a new spirit of general confidence" arose.⁷⁷ To the south at a Turkish garrison, "hope . . . animated everyone . . . and put . . . an end to the disagreeable nightmare."⁷⁸

Without Russian military documents, it is difficult to gage with any exactness the immediate effect of the allied victory upon the Russian army in Sevastopol. In any event a sound basis had been laid for the eventual defeat of the Tsar's forces. Remarkd a Britisher,

it may be said unhesitatingly, that it would have been better for Russia had an army of 50,000 men been slaughtered by the Allies, than that this Sea *should* have been forced and those ports destroyed . . . the seizure of the Sea . . . is the most important event which has yet marked the war.⁷⁹

The Kerch operation not only brought renewed self-assurance to Englishmen and Frenchmen everywhere, but it broke the year-old stalemate before Sevastopol and removed the last obstacle to the complete blockade of the city. The communication and supply route from Sevastopol to the Sea of Azov and the Russian interior was cut; grain, ammunition, and other stores for the city were obliterated; the Sea was left devoid of shipping. French Admiral Bruat, writing to the Minister of Marine in June 1855, well summed up the situation:

The material damage already done to the enemy, the embarrassment that he must necessarily shortly experience from the destruction of immense stores of provisions destined for his army in the Crimea, the moral effect of a new invasion carried to the banks of the

⁷⁶Raglan to Panmure, before Sevastopol, 5 June 1855, quoted in *The Illustrated London News*, 23 June 1855, p. 619. Also see Raglan to Panmure, [before Sevastopol], 6 June 1855, in Nolan, *op. cit.*, II, 374; and Stirling's journal, 28 May 1855, in Stirling, *op. cit.*, p. 263.

⁷⁷Statement of Pelissier, *Black Sea*, p. 14.

⁷⁸*The Times*, 13 June 1855.

⁷⁹*The Illustrated London News*, 16 June 1855, p. 614.

Don . . . all demonstrate the importance of this expedition.⁸⁰

Admiral Bruat's remarks were prophetic. During the late spring and summer, the British and French armies moved forward, retreated, moved closer again toward Sevastopol. In the night of 8 September 1855 the Russians, suffering heavily, moved out northward and, on the following day, the allied field forces trudged into the evacuated and blazing city. "Hurrah, Gus!" a soldier shouted, "we've gone and done it. Sevastopol's ours. It's true as that you are alive."⁸¹

What was proved by the attack at Kerch? In the appraisal of the significance of the victory at Kerch and the fall of Sevastopol, an important place must be accorded the British Navy. The attack had proved conclusively to the public that the Navy, which had lain dormant and useless before Sevastopol, could be a potent instrument, and led military and naval planners to the realization that British naval might could be used effectively against the enemy. A "circumstance which causes us the most sincere satisfaction," explained a news editor, "is, that the rapidity with which this squadron has swept the Sea of Azoff is the first exploit in the present war which the navy [navies] have been enabled to perform on their own ele-

ment." The Russians had bottled up their fleet in Sevastopol Harbor, had sunk or burned many of their ships, and "no real opportunity had been afforded to the [British] fleet for an achievement worthy of its power." Now, newspapers began emphasizing the "irresistible superiority [of] the . . . [allied] maritime strength."⁸²

British naval units backed up the initial victory and continued to help the field forces in the siege of Sevastopol. Through the summer months and into the fall, flotillas repeatedly bombarded, raided, and destroyed stores, ships, and buildings at Berdiansk, Arabat, Genitchi, and Taganrog. This continued even after the capture of Sevastopol. Stirred up by the success of the first amphibious operation, allied army and naval units, profiting from the lessons learned at Kerch, co-operated in a second such venture, capturing the Russian base at Kinburn, located on the estuaries of the Dnieper and the Bug.

This is not to say that amphibious assaults were conceived of first in the Crimean campaign for such operations had been employed successfully in previous wars. But the rapidity of execution, the devastating follow-ups, and the covering barrage from ships' batteries anticipated modern land-sea tactics.

⁸⁰Bruat to Minister of Marine, Kerch, 1 June 1855, quoted in *The Times*, 15 June 1855.

⁸¹Pepper to Sarkinson, Sevastopol, September 1855, in Ensign Thomas Pepper, "Ensign Pepper's Letters from Sevastopol," *The New Monthly Magazine*, CV (1855), 289.

⁸²*The Times*, 4 June 1855. Also see *ibid.*, 14 June 1855; *The Illustrated London News*, 16 June 1855, p. 614; and *The Nautical Magazine and Naval Chronicle*, XXIV (1855), 377.

VAN RIPER'S SURVEY OF MILITARY MANAGEMENT

The attention of all military historians is called to the excellent and comprehensive "Survey of Materials for the Study of Military Management," compiled by Professor Paul P. Van Riper of Cornell University, and published in *American Political Science*

Review, XLIX (September 1955), 828-50. This has been reprinted as a pamphlet by the Graduate School of Business and Public Administration, Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y. Single copies are free and bulk orders are priced at 25¢ per copy.

DEVELOPMENT OF PACK ARTILLERY AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN MODERN WARFARE

BY MICHAEL F. PARRINO*

The advent of the "atomic" cannon has created a strong presumption that the capabilities for which pack artillery has long been noted can be just as feasibly utilized on a modern battlefield as they have been on the battlegrounds of past conflicts. As a tactical arm of well-proved ability in the timely delivery of firepower it behooves us to re-appraise its potential in the light of this latest innovation in warfare.

We need only be reminded of the fact that the primary mission of pack artillery, as of all artillery, is the support of ground troops. The more potent the firepower the more effective the support. Pack artillery employing "atomic" warheads would enhance its ability to reach the inaccessible and its capacity to lend a maximum amount of firepower under conditions unsuited to other types of artillery.

Since atomic power, in general, is merely a form of firepower, the brief history which follows may lend assistance to all who recognize its potential to experiment further in its development within the operational orbit of this venerable branch of the service.

To begin with the military has been, even up to the Korean Conflict, a natural employer of the animal. Transport has always been the subject of inquiry in the preparation and conduct of war. Animal transport, at least, supplied a partial solution. From the beginning it won favor among army commanders.

Although many kinds of animals have been used in military transport, for the sake of expediency, we shall refer only to the mule

as he, above all others, has proved to be the most versatile as well as the most useful.

No less than 10,000 span of mules, for instance, were employed to supply the engines of Sulla's siege train when that warrior invested the Piraeus as reported by Plutarch. Antony's "carroballistae" or carriages transported artillery weapons, each carriage being drawn by mules.²

Mountain artillery itself is believed to have been created first at Perpignan during the 15th century.³ The mule from then on became a serious object of experiment for employment in pack artillery, in general. Three centuries later, during the War of the Spanish Succession, this type of artillery really came into its own and its future use was established.

The term "mountain artillery," however, embraces more than the concept of warfare in hilly country. In the words of Major A. S. Fleming, F. A., "mountain artillery is a misnomer for artillery transported on pack animals." Originally, doubtless, mountainous country wherein artillery could not operate, gave the reason for the name. In the Philippines, such artillery can penetrate jungles, etc., which are comparatively impassable for wheeled artillery, and had artillery of the former kind been used in such terrain it might equally as well have been

¹As noted by Major General J. F. C. Fuller, "Artillery in the Classical Age," *Army Ordnance*, Vol. 13, 1932-1933.

²As noted by Major General J. F. C. Fuller, "The Artillery of the Carthaginians, Greeks and Romans," *Journal of the Royal Artillery*, Vol. 58, 1931-1932, citing Plutarch on Antony and Vegetius.

³Capt. E. C. Goebert, Ord. Dept., "Our New Pack Artillery," *Army Ordnance*, Vol. XIII, 1932-1933.

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termed "jungle artillery."⁴

"Pack artillery is a more apt name than mountain artillery, as the term removes the artificial and erroneous conceptions as the limitations of the uses and of the tactical roles of such artillery."⁵

With the emphasis on this type of service, the problems involved in its transport gave the mule an added importance. Instead of pulling field pieces as in Antony's time, he now was called upon to carry them.⁶ What other animal, hardier than he, was more adapted for carrying heavy pieces of artillery upon his back!

But it was not as simple as all that. The requirements of artillery in general were becoming more pronounced as wars grew in complexity. The concept of close infantry support, for instance, involved compelling tactical considerations of how best to provide additional gun power at any given time and place.⁷

This concept, too, was readily applied to mountain or pack artillery, working with the Infantry, but with slight variation.⁸ In-

⁴Elbridge Colby, in his informative book, *Army Talk—A Familiar Dictionary of Soldiers' Speech*, makes note of the fact that "Mountain artillery" has also been known as "jughead artillery" although never referred to as such in the American Army. See also n. 34 relative to the Mars Task Force.

⁵Major A. S. Fleming, F. A., "Pack Artillery," *Field Artillery Journal*, Vol. III, 1913; see also, Capt. J. G. Dooner, R. F. A., "The New Drill Regulations for the Japanese Field Artillery," *Journal of the Royal Artillery*, Vol. 40, 1913.

⁶Also, about 8 years earlier, a mountain howitzer, the M1841, also known as a 12-pounder, was officially incorporated into the organization of the U. S. Army. Note comments of Major James Abbot quoted in "Mountain Artillery in 1849" by Col. H. R. Goulding, *Journal of the United Service Institute of India*, Vol. XLIX, 1920.

⁷For an example of the use of pack artillery in close support, see Lt. Col. Mazen, "Diary of an Artilleryman in Morocco," a current resume appearing in the Foreign Military Journal Section, *Field Artillery Journal*, Vol. 18, 1928.

⁸Capt. H. M. J. McIntyre, R. A., "Pack Artillery—Present and Future," *Royal Artillery Journal*, Vol. 52, 1925-1926; but, see Pompey, "Close Support Artillery," *Royal Artillery Journal*, Vol. 52, 1925-1926, favoring the retention of the 3.7 pack howitzer as a weapon of

stead of being employed as guns in direct support they were applied as guns of accompaniment. The latter were more an integral part of the Infantry and their use was restricted, mainly to local actions. Long ranges for pack artillery, needless to say, were given little tactical considerations. Capt. McIntyre of the Royal Artillery reports that "the idea of a gun of accompaniment was practiced for many years by mountain artillery operating in expeditions on the North-west Frontier of India."⁹ Such guns were used in the Pyrenees during the War of the Spanish Succession. These artillery pieces, incidentally, weighed 110 pounds and were transported on individual mules.¹⁰ Later, a gun weighing 165 pounds came into use, and still later, one weighing 220 pounds, termed an "amulette,"¹¹ found its place in mountain warfare. Weights of weapons, as may be noted, were on the increase, and it was recognized that even the mule imposed certain limits upon himself in his capacity to carry.

The concept of using pack artillery in close support, however, not only was found to afford a flexible companion to the infantry, but rapid improvements in the design of pieces afforded the Queen of Battles far more firepower than it had ever housed before. At the same time, as guns improved, longer ranges were becoming possible. But, increased ranges required heavier and more powerful guns, and since a mule could not carry more than nature intended, pieces were designed in sections. Even at Perpignan, it is said, pack animals carried "pieces of ordnance composed of two parts."¹²

close support without the necessity of transporting it on pack.

⁹"Close Support Artillery," *loc. cit.*

¹⁰"Our New Pack Artillery," *loc. cit.*

¹¹"... a swiveled and stocked gun firing solid, ball shots," *ibid.*

¹²Capt. A. R. Ginsburgh, F. A., "The Rise and Fall of the Two Nine Five," *Field Artillery Journal* XXI, 457-68 (1932).

The sections themselves, were becoming increasingly heavy, and by the same token, their poundage was, of necessity, again limited by the maximum loading capacity of the mule.¹³ Equally important was the fact that the animal had to move about with facility and dispatch.¹⁴ This, obviously, he could not do if loaded beyond his natural limits.

With these considerations in mind, artillerymen strove to reduce pack artillery to a formula predicated to the production of maximum firepower with the lightest gun ballistically possible, qualified by a limitation on the number of mules necessary to justify its function as a supporting arm.

The original screw gun, immortalized by Rudyard Kipling, was carried in two parts, each being screwed together upon coming into action.¹⁵ The 1.65-inch Hotchkiss mountain gun, possessed a maximum range of 3,500 yards, was carried on three pack mules.¹⁶ The piece was broken down into gun and wheels for the first mule; carriage for the second; and four ammunition boxes for the third. Following this came the British 2.95 and the 3-inch Hotchkiss which suggested an organization of one gun mule; one carriage mule; one wheel, shafts, and accessory mule; and six ammunition mules.¹⁷ It is to be noted that the number of mules needed was progressively increasing.

In 1794, the Austrians, like the French, were possessed of light guns whose wheels and axles were removable from the carriage for pack transportation.¹⁸ It is interesting to note that as early as 1780 the British were experimenting with rockets which they believed were the solution to mountain artillery. As a consequence, the development of mountain artillery suffered, for as Capt. Goebert reports, "delay caused by rocket experiments found the English as late as 1850 with no solution of a caliber of artillery suitable for mountain use."¹⁹ But this was made up for, partly, in the fact that thirty years later the English produced the first British gun and carriage which could be taken apart and transported on pack as separate loads.²⁰

The best known of all pieces at this time was, of course, the famed 2.95-inch howitzer. This piece came in four sections—the gun and breech, the cradle (including recoil mechanisms), the trail, and the wheels and axle. Although the 2.95 was of British design, it found much favor with the American artilleryman, so much so that it served the Field Artillery for thirty years.²¹ It is probably the most revered gun in the annals of the United States Army for its use came during a period in American history when successful campaigns in the Philippines brought new and added prestige to the American Army.²² The aforementioned 3-inch Hotchkiss mountain gun which the Army also possessed could not match the 2.95 and was subsequently discarded in favor

¹³Lt. Col. H. A. Bethell, R. A., *Modern Guns and Gunnery*, 1907; see also, "Our New Pack Artillery," *loc. cit.*

¹⁴See Capt. A. D. Schenck, "The Pack Mule and Mountain Artillery," *Journal of the United States Artillery*, III, 583-605 (1894), for considerations relative to the use of pack artillery in conjunction with cavalry; see also, Major General Sir J. Moore, "Wastage of Animals in War," *Journal of the United Service Institution of India*, Vol. XLIX, 1920.

¹⁵A 7-pr. weighing 400 lbs.; see *Modern Guns and Gunnery*.

¹⁶A. B. Dyer, *Handbook for Light Artillery*, 1898.

¹⁷*Ibid.*; see also, "Our New Pack Artillery," *loc. cit.*

¹⁸"Our New Pack Artillery," *loc. cit.*

¹⁹*Ibid.*

²⁰*Ibid.*

²¹"The Rise and Fall of the Two Nine Five," *loc. cit.* see also "Our New Pack Artillery," *loc. cit.*, also H. W. Daly's *Manual of Pack Transportation*, Quartermaster Corps, 1916; also, known as the 2.95 Vickers-Maxim Mountain Gun.

²²The Battle of Bud Dajo in the Philippines affords a notable example of the capabilities of mountain artillery under the most adverse conditions. For an interesting account see "The Rise and Fall of the Two Nine Five," *loc. cit.*

of the latter. It took this campaign to elevate the status of pack artillery within the over-all organization of the Army, for previous to this time very little use was made of such artillery, although pack transport, in general, was much in demand during the Mexican and Civil Wars, and the numerous campaigns against the Indians.

Following the 2.95, the first 75-mm howitzer, the M1, appeared, and, since 1931, only slight modifications (M1A1) have been effected. The M1 is broken down into six sections: the tube assembly, the breech mechanism and wheels (wooden), the top sleigh and cradle, the bottom sleigh, the front trail, and the rear trail. Each is borne by a pack mule with the breech and wheels constituting one load. The M1A1, however, employs seven mules. The breech is combined with pioneer tools. The addition of the seventh mule is due to the adoption of pneumatic tires (M8) which weigh more than the wooden wheels. The M1A1, however, may be drawn by the latter type.

Experiments with the 75-mm howitzer were begun as early as 1919, when a special subcommittee was appointed by the Chief of Ordnance to consider specifications for the design and manufacture of this type of artillery.²³ This was ultimately designed to

be carried in four sections—tube and breech, cradle, trail, and lastly, the wheels. However, before this howitzer was fully adopted, new plans were drawn for a much more appropriate piece, offering range increases through utilization of more powerful cartridges or rounds offering greater muzzle velocities. This approach, as many believed, was a radical departure from the orthodox concept of molding a howitzer section around the use of, at the most, four animals, each necessarily limited to a certain load weight.²⁴ "This," as Capt. Goebert notes, "had naturally placed a definite limitation on the maximum permissible weight of the unit and directly limited the weapon to a comparatively low muzzle velocity for the weight of the projectile specified"²⁵

It is interesting to note that the pack howitzer, model 1920, herein referred to, had a muzzle velocity of only 900 feet per second, whereas, the present M1 has a maximum muzzle velocity of 1,250 feet per second with a maximum range of about 9,600 yards.²⁶ The difference in velocities is accounted for by the fact that the M1 is a heavier and much more powerful howitzer. But, where four mules were employed to transport the 1920

Type	Weight in Firing Position	Range	Pounds Per Range Per Yard
75-mm Pack Howitzer, M1	1269	9200	.137
75-mm Gun, 1897, French	2657	9200	.289
75-mm Gun, Mark I	3280	14880	.220
75-mm Infantry, Mortar, M2	375	2000	.188
Vickers-Armstrong, 2.95-in. M1929	1526	9850	.155
Skoda 75-mm, 1928	1550	9700	.159
Schneider, 75-mm, 1919	1507	9058	.166

²³"Our New Pack Artillery," *loc. cit.*

²⁴250 pounds may be considered an average weight, although some of the larger mules can carry up to 300 pounds.

²⁵"Our New Pack Artillery," *loc. cit.*

²⁶75-mm Howitzer, M1 (Pack), Practical Work Sheet No. 1, dated Jan. 1943, Dept. of Materiel, Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Okla.

model, six are utilized for the heavier M1.²⁷ The total weight of the latter must be distributed over an even number of animals, bearing in mind that the pack mule's weight-bearing capacities remain constant. At any rate, it is the lightest weapon providing for the maximum range which best serves the needs of pack artillery, and as noted in the preceding table, the low percentage index for the 75-mm pack howitzer, M1, reflects this ratio in relation to other weapons of the same class.²⁸

Just prior to World War I, in which basic precepts of land warfare adhered closely to those of countless conflicts before, it seems nowise strange to note that pack artillery should have occupied so much attention of the military as an incidence of prime consideration in any military movement.²⁹ What few advancements in tactics and techniques had transpired since the advent of wheeled

artillery had enhanced rather than discouraged the further use of pack artillery. Even the broader aspects of comparatively late military operations, reflected by a rising surge in mobile fighting power, did not necessarily preclude the team of mules, men, and guns from further consideration in future planning. They were not to be foredoomed to obscurity so easily. In fact, the ever growing range and breadth of any Army envisioned a more extensive role than ever before for this slow-moving but hard-hitting branch of the service. The reason was quite obvious. The character of war, heretofore, had been keyed to the foot soldier and to the establishment of personal contact with the enemy, aided by the firepower of the artillery support. There are good, sound military reasons, even today, to embrace that principle as basic and vital despite the many specific advances in lethal instruments of war.

Now that armies were extending their activities along many fronts, embracing terrain of any type, pack artillery earned a comparatively greater prominence in the over-all strategy of campaigns. It was not surprising to note, then, that military men looked with considerable favor upon the establishment of a more efficient pack-transport and pack-artillery service. As a result, around the turn of the century, and in most countries, there was a flurry of activity directed toward further design and experiment.

Thus, we find France, Italy, Austria, and Japan establishing special corps for recruits to train in the mountain artillery,³⁰ which, as noted previously, is included within the framework of pack artillery in general. We note the Serbians and the Turks making

²⁷After many tests, it was finally adopted in 1927, (seven mules are employed, however, for howitzers equipped with pneumatic tires).

²⁸"Our New Pack Artillery, *loc. cit.*; TH 9-2300 lists a maximum range of 9600 yards for the M1A1.

²⁹"Modern Guns and Gunnery"; Capt. Atanasio Torres, Spanish Army, "The Krupp 7.5 cm. Rapid Fire Gun in the Cuban Campaign," *Journal of the United States Artillery*, Vol. 9, 1898; Report of Board of Officers to Consider Questions Concerning Types of Field Guns and Ammunition Supply, *Field Artillery Journal*, Vol. III, 1913; Capt. N. L. Walford, R. A., "Strategical Geography," *Minutes of Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution*, XII, 65 (1884); Lt. D. Armstrong, C. A., "Activity of Field and Heavy Artillery in the Russo-Japanese Campaign and the Influence of the War Experiences There on our Use of Artillery Today," *Field Artillery Journal*, Vol. III, 1913; *Handbook for Light Artillery*, Colonel C. DeSausmarez, "Pack or Single Draught," *Royal Artillery Journal*, Vol. 52, 1925, 1926; Capt. A. D. Schenck, "Pack Saddles and a Powerful Mountain Gun," *Journal of the United States Artillery*, Vol. IX, 1898; "New Drill Regulations for the Japanese Field Artillery," *loc. cit.*; Colonel A. H. C. Philpotts, "Some Teachings of the War in the Balkans on the Tactical and Technical Employment of Artillery," translated from the *Revue d'Artillerie*, Feb. 1913, *Journal of the Royal Artillery*, Vol. XL, 1913; "The Pack Mule and Mountain Artillery," *loc. cit.*; Lt. C. E. Callwell, R. A., "Notes on the Tactics of Our Small Wars," *Minutes of Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution*, XII, 531-52 (1884).

³⁰Capt. A. Mortureux, French Army, "Some Remarks on Mountain Artillery," *Field Artillery Journal*, Vol. XII, 1922, (reprinted from *Revue d'Artillerie*, 1922); see also, *Modern Guns and Gunnery*.

great use of their mountain artillery in the war between them.³¹ And we find that although the Japanese had 162 mountain pieces for operation in mountainous regions, Russia had hardly any at all in the Russo-Japanese war.³²

The loss of Manchuria by the Russians was, in a large measure, the result of underestimating the potentialities of mountain artillery for terrain such as this country offers.³³ And it would not be at all surprising to see this land area occupied by such mountain units again, should a future war develop. The Russo-Japanese War, at least, awakened the British to foresee the tremendous possibilities of mountain artillery in India, and as a result, the 1st and 2nd Mountain Artillery Brigades were formed in England in 1929 "to supplement the Field Artillery in the event of Great Britain being at war in a mountainous country."³⁴

Although England had made extensive use of mountain artillery in India and Afghanistan, the lack of it enabled the Boers on one occasion to inflict a disastrous defeat upon

"Sir George Colley who, with a force of five hundred men, climbed Majuba Hill which overlooked the hostile positions spread out at the foot of the mountain."³⁵ As Lt. Callwell of the Royal Artillery relates, "Colley could do nothing. He had no mountain artillery. Consequently, the Boers crept up unseen, picking off Britishers here and there and surprised the tired men."³⁶ It is significant to note that General Roberts who finally inflicted a series of defeats upon the Boer Army, was, on the contrary an advocate of mountain artillery, his march from Kabul to Kandahar evidencing his preference for this service.³⁷

The German Army, on the other hand, did not attach much importance to this branch of the service, for, in 1914, it found itself entirely unprepared for mountain operations, not having trained or equipped any troops nor provided for their organization.³⁸

With the conclusion of the first World War, the pack artillery of the U. S. Army suffered the lot of most specialized units—the impracticability of its maintenance once peace had been established.

Then, too, pack artillery, being slow and cumbersome, was being confronted with the concept of mechanized warfare, and there remained but few advocates who believed in the former's protracted use.³⁹ Though it was generally recognized that only pack artillery could cope with the jungles and the mountains and the inaccessible, it had to deal with a far more disturbing element—the

³¹"Some Teachings of the War in the Balkans on the Tactical and Technical Employment of Artillery," *loc. cit.*

³²"Activity of Field and Heavy Artillery in the Russo-Japanese Campaign and the Influence of the War Experiences There on Our Use of Artillery Today," *loc. cit.*; note also that Japan highly regarded the value of mountain artillery as evidenced in "New Drill Regulations for the Japanese Field Artillery," *loc. cit.*

³³"Activity of Field and Heavy Artillery in the Russo-Japanese Campaign . . .," *loc. cit.*

³⁴"Pack or Single Draught," *loc. cit.*; also, note that during World War II the need for pack-artillery units in the China-Burma-India Theatre brought about the formation of such units as the Mars Task Force, specially trained for jungle fighting; also it is interesting to note in this connection that although the British utilized pack transport when Henry V set out for Calais during the Hundred Years War, no mountain guns were provided. Consequently, all his artillery had to be sent by sea (as noted by Major-General Sir John Headlow in his article, "The English Artillery in the Middle Ages," *Royal Artillery Journal*, Vol. 68, 1941).

³⁵"Notes on the Tactics of Our Small Wars," *loc. cit.*

³⁶*Ibid.*

³⁷*Ibid.*; see also, Lt. Col. G. T. Pretymann, R. A., "Rough Notes on the Kabul-Kandahar March of Aug. 1880," *Minutes of Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution*, XII, 1 (1884).

³⁸From the Current Resume of Foreign Military Journals Section, *Field Artillery Journal*, Vol. 18, 1928.

³⁹Major General J. H. Richardson, R. A., "Motor Versus Mule," *Royal Artillery Journal*, Vol. 40, 1913-1914.

notion that pack artillery was as obsolete as the musket.⁴⁰

Notwithstanding the recognition of a few regarding the exacting requirements for this service or the reputation it had earned as an indispensable arm in previous wars, the future of pack artillery dimmed in the shadow of this embryonic, but rapidly growing, concept of mobile warfare as it was entertained in the mid-twenties.

And so the development of pack artillery, particularly our own, stagnated in the intervening years between the two great wars. Yet, ironically enough, it was the latest con-

⁴⁰"Close Support Artillery," *loc. cit.*

flict, characterized by blitzkriegs and large-scale operations, which demanded greater participation by pack artillery than at any other time in the history of warfare.⁴¹

All things remaining equal, it is quite possible that with the seemingly ultimate in firepower now at its disposal, pack artillery again may participate in any modern war at least as effectively as in former years.

⁴¹During the Italian campaigns of World War II, it is said, fifteen to twenty pack-artillery battalions could have been easily used to advantage had they been available. On the other hand, three such battalions sent to the Southwest Pacific were rendered ineffective because our mules became sick.

MILITARY HISTORY COURSES

MILITARY HISTORY AT UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS

Otis A. Singletary who last year won the AMI's Moncado award and whose excellent article on "The Negro Militia During Radical Reconstruction" was published in our last issue, writes that he is currently offering in the Department of History of the University of Texas a survey of "American Military Affairs Since 1775." A sophomore-level course, it carries three semester hours of credit, and has 160 students currently enrolled. As Singletary describes it, the course is

a survey of military affairs in the United States from the American Revolution to the present, seeking to acquaint the student with the problems involved in waging war and the effects of war upon the society which wages it. The course is primarily an appraisal of the American military experience, with particular emphasis upon military policy, civil-military relations, and the evolution of the concept of total war.

Just now this is exclusively a lecture course, but, Singletary says, in all likelihood many things will be changed the next time it is offered.

SEMINAR ON PHILOSOPHY OF WAR

The Seminar on the Philosophy of War, jointly sponsored by the AMI and St. John's College, and conducted by Institute Librarian George J. Stansfield and Lt. Colonel Franklin B. Nihart, USMC, is being held every Thursday evening at the Navy Department Building in Washington.

This is the third year that this seminar has been held in the Washington area. It is concerned with the principal streams of thought that have influenced the conduct of war in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Assigned readings relating to the topic for each session provide the basis for discussion. Some of the topics discussed are: War and Manifest Destiny; the Impact of Technology on the Conduct of War; Problems Raised by Unlimited War; The American Civil War; and Attempts to Limit War. Complete information with respect to the Seminar may be obtained from George J. Stansfield, 617 South Washington Street, Alexandria, Virginia.

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NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES

THE MILITARY AND THE COLD WAR

BY FRANKLYN A. JOHNSON*

IN ANY discussion of "the military and the cold war," it should be noted what is meant by the term "the military." We ordinarily speak of the military as an instrument of government, a group of men organized to carry out policies of that government. We also see the military men of all three services as possessing certain attitudes, opinions, and ideals in common, capable of and often desirous of influencing both policy decisions and the implementation of those decisions once made. It is the latter aspect, in relation to the present vast world responsibilities of the American people, which will be considered here.

"... We must expect in the round world of today to be under siege for as long as we can see ahead..."¹ as phrased by Arnold J. Toynbee. The following brief commentary accepts this general assumption that the cold war, in the form of steady psychologico-economic pressures or a series of military attacks by such Russian satellites as North Korea,² will continue into the indefinite future. Behind such limited-objective policies, pursued with their customary vigor and self-confidence by the Communist powers, will lurk dangerously the threat of an all-out on-

slaught upon the West.

If it is granted that "... this nation faces a security problem more critical and more complex..."³ than ever before, it is evident that we and our friends must steadily match the predominant and growing form of Communist power—military force and the continuing possibility of its use. This is not to underrate the usefulness of psychological warfare and economic weapons as deterrents and as partial counter-balances to the buildup of Communist military strength. But God still seems to be on the side of the big battalions, with their inevitable accompaniment: great military influence in the use of manpower, in industry, in atomic development, in scientific research, in education, in foreign policy.

Until a dozen or so years ago, our people not only would have shuddered at such a long-term trend, but they probably would have reversed it firmly. Since the earliest days of the Republic, as both DeTocqueville and Bryce noted, the place of the military in American society and government has been an area of chronic sensitivity and powerful biases. The chief reasons seem to have been six in number: (1) the heritage of Anglo-Saxon distrust of power, particularly that of the military type, and as experienced with respect to the activities of Cromwell; (2) the influence of the Enlightenment as a movement

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¹Arnold J. Toynbee, "The Siege of the West," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXI (Jan., 1953), 285.

²S. Passony, *One Hundred Years of Conflict*, pp. 356-58.

³Louis Smith, *American Democracy and Military Power*, p. 316.

of opposition to tyranny, caste, and force; (3) events in the earlier period of American history such as the billeting of British soldiers in colonial homes, the march of unpaid Revolutionary soldiers upon the Continental Congress, the creation of the aristocratic order of the Cincinnati, and the use of troops to put down Shay's Rebellion; (4) European examples of military threats and coups such as those associated with Napoleon I, Napoleon III, and General Boulanger; (5) the hatred of nineteenth-century European immigrants toward national service and toward a noble or military class; and (6) the belief that our geographic isolation made unnecessary and expensive and potentially dangerous the luxury of standing forces.

Distrust of the military, rooted in factors such as these and others, significantly influenced the Founding Fathers in the drafting of the Constitution. Down through the peacetime decades, suspicion made the enlisted soldier and even his officer objects of scorn. And after each national emergency had safely passed, we "controlled" the military power by destroying it. The Second World War, however, ushered in an era in which we could no longer rid ourselves of the problem by destroying it. Our "natural" security vanished in a conflict so stupendous that military influence of necessity permeated all levels and sectors of governmental activity, whether directly related to war-making or not.⁴ Under the irresistible pressure of successive diplomatic and military emergencies, new machinery such as the Office of Strategic Services, Joint Chiefs of Staff, combined Chiefs and Boards, and State-War-Navy Coordinating committee, emerged.⁵ In each, the

generals and admirals were predominant or extremely powerful. Their prestige, resulting from the high level of thought demonstrated therein, as well as from combat action, lasted into the postwar period.

With the advent of peace, and even before we realized that we had lost one enemy only to be faced with another, two official decisions caused a few careful observers to question *what kind* and *how strong* a voice the top brass should have. These were the acquisition (primarily for the Navy) of the strategic Pacific islands despite stubborn State Department opposition, and the territorial and policy-making control of the occupied areas by the Army.

Amid continuing conditions of guerilla or twilight war, President Truman, the former battery commander, repeatedly demonstrated his respect for the senior officers. He loaded them with weighty responsibilities, sometimes only indirectly connected with the armed forces.⁶ As never before, high career officers went aboard as ambassadors, special envoys, *ad hoc* political negotiators, or United Nations arbiters. Others became cabinet ministers, Under and Assistant Secretaries of State, Atomic Energy Commissioner, Directors of Central Intelligence, War Assets Administrator, Chiefs of the Veterans Administration, and Deputy Director of the Foreign Operations Administration.⁷ The services were well represented on the White House staff and even in the precedent-shattering

⁶See, for example, *The New York Times*, 8 Jan., 1949, p. 1; 18 May, 1950, p. 1; 19 Sept., 1950, p. 20.

⁷This trend has had its parallel, for basically the same reasons, in Britain. To such earlier examples of professional officers in high civil posts as Secretary of State for War Earl Kitchener, First Lord of the Admiralty Viscount Monsell, and Minister for the Coordination of Defense Lord Chatfield, can be added contemporary office-holders such as Field Marshal Earl Alexander, Minister of Defense; Brigadier A. H. Head, Secretary for War; and General Sir G. Templar, High Commissioner for Malaya.

⁴Ray S. Cline, *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division*, pp. 313, 331-32.

⁵The last three particularly followed British organization. See my "Defense by Committee: the Origins and Early Development of the British Committee of Imperial Defense, 1885-1916," unpublished dissertation (1952) in the Harvard University Archives.

chairmanship of civilian inter-departmental committees. So thoroughly has the legislative branch approved of such nominations that, almost without exception, they have gained unanimous or overwhelming consent.

President Truman, furthermore, recognized the need for the institutionalization of the military in national and foreign policy-making. Guided by the experience of both the British higher politico-military organization and the wartime combined and joint bodies, he secured the adoption of the present basic statute. The organization for defense is still not truly unified, but it has been greatly strengthened. It now possesses a regular seat in the highest *national* policy-making body, the National Security Council; it has a collective *military* policy-making council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the military are endowed with a spokesman, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, known to the whole nation and capable, whether he wishes it or not, of acquiring a great popular following. Power in the Department of Defense seems to rest principally in the office of the civilian Secretary, and in the hands of the four ranking officers who form the Joint Chiefs. Dean Bundy has bluntly warned us that ". . . there is no force in government which is fully a match for the Joint Chiefs of Staff . . ."⁸ but the strident 1953 reorganization battle ended with the strengthening of the Secretary in some area, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in others.⁹

The ever-present danger that opposing political leaders and parties will take differing and excessively outspoken experts, such as members of the Joint Chiefs, to their respective bosoms, can be illustrated by the MacArthur affair. This is not the place to exhume the well-examined case of "the

general and the president," but many will recall the comment of the prominent opposition member (later chairman) of the House Armed Services Committee, Dewey Short, to the effect that *vox MacArturi, vox dei*. In support of the Democratic Administration stood the Joint Chiefs. The widespread use of *military* knowledge and prestige by the parties in pressing their respective *political* cases upon the people could lead eventually to experts being on top rather than on tap.

Our legislators have moved beyond the mere acceptance of presidential nomination of military leaders to formerly civilian posts, as shown by the confirmation of General George C. Marshall as Secretary of Defense in 1950. This was only three years after the passage of the National Security Act containing the specific proviso that this position could be held only by civilians. The Congress, acting on President Truman's emphasis upon the general's "unique qualifications," amended the law and then overwhelmingly endorsed the lifelong military officer who was also undeniably a brilliant administrator of wide experience.¹⁰ Precedent, however, is often the handmaiden of habit; will this precedent be invoked in some future crisis for an officer of far different temperament than a Marshall?¹¹

An example of the same tendency in the Executive Branch was the appointment of a well-trained and apparently very able major general, Kenneth D. Nichols, to be general manager of the Atomic Energy Commission. This would seem to imply that there were no civilians available or competent enough for this post of vast peacetime foreign and domestic significance. The Commission chairman, Rear Admiral Lewis Strauss, went out of his way to describe General Nichols as

⁸McGeorge Bundy, "November, 1952: Imperatives of Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, XXXI (Oct., 1952), 8.

⁹*The New York Times*, especially 23 April, 3 May, and 14-29 June, 1953.

¹⁰*Congressional Record*, 20 Sept., 1950, p. 15468.

¹¹See, in this connection, E. S. Corwin, *The President: Office and Powers*, Chapter 6.

the "natural choice."¹² In spite of his unusual abilities, however, after a year and a half in office, General Nichols retired to a private engineering consultancy. He was succeeded by Brigadier General Kenneth E. Fields.¹³ These appointments, as well as the naming of generals to fill top posts in the Immigration Service, indicate that neither party has a monopoly.¹⁴ And the public has turned more and more to military "natural choices" for college presidents, corporation executives, and lawmakers.

It seems evident that, as we have inexorably slipped deeper and deeper into the sink-hole of permanent crisis, we have gradually turned with less restraint to loyal, famous, and perhaps even historic generals and admirals for executive leadership, even for the Chief Executive himself. Many of our citizens, shocked out of complacency by the sudden disappearance of security without effort and the ominous division of the world into two ideological camps, have accepted fatalistically the likelihood, even inevitability, of another great war. New fears having eroded away the old, we have welcomed to a degree the military opinions and methods we formerly distrusted.

The eighteenth-century's dread of a coup by a military man on horseback is of course quite fantastic in twentieth-century America. Nor does the danger lie in the single facts of placing able military leaders in high places, or of possessing large armed services, or of appropriating vast sums for unproductive purposes, or of assuming world-wide diplomatic responsibilities. It is, rather, in the long-term development here of a public opinion, derived from *all* these facts, which tires of piled-up arms and an uncertain balance upon the abyss of a conflict initiated by another — as Hamilton said, the "con-

tinual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger."¹⁵ Our people might conceivably accept regimentation at home, reject honorably compromise and negotiation aboard, and welcome a thorough-going military leadership of foreign policy.

The following three interesting and unanswered questions occur in this connection: to what extent have affairs been influenced by reason of the recent service by a host of voters and legislators in the armed forces; what attitudes are our people likely to formulate if the draft is replaced by a long-term universal military training; and how widely accepted is and might later become the preventive-war policy already overtly or indirectly proposed by Major General Orville Anderson, Henry Luce, James Burnham, and former Navy Secretary Francis Mathews?

Despite such discouraging possibilities, I think that we must not blind ourselves to the changed breed of cat which we now have in both the ranking and middle-ranking officers. Compare the receptivity to new ideas and weapons, the policies and personal characteristics of Generals Arthur MacArthur or Pershing with President Eisenhower or Secretary Marshall. Compare Earl Kitchener as British Secretary for War in 1914-1916 with Earl Alexander as recent Minister of Defense. It seems a fair generalization to say that the "military mind" of old — narrow, unimaginative, rigid, belligerent, although conditioned by democratic traditions — has been replaced by a much more broad-visioned, thoughtful and flexible mentality, even regarding unification!¹⁶ Factors such as these have blurred the distinction between civilian and military policy-makers: better and broader service education; greater contact with non-service elements in society; more democracy in the services; an individual security derived from social acceptance and

¹²*The New York Times*, 2 Oct., 1953, p. 16.

¹³*Ibid.*, 14 April, 1955, p. 8.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 22 April, 1954, p. 6; 19 May, 1954, p. 5.

¹⁵*The Federalist*, Number 8.

¹⁶Cline, *op. cit.*, p. 329.

even popularity; a recognition that the horrors and uncertainties of modern war often point to caution in policy-making; and a greater insight into complex international responsibilities.

But what of the future? How can we reconcile the simultaneous maintenance of the liberty of ourselves and our friends from without, and the basic principles of freedom, democracy and civil control within? We can take steps in the fields of government and education which give muscle to the civilian elements, rather than weakening the military. For when wild dogs are loose in the world, power is essential. We have learned, I hope, that power is just as necessary to the righteous as to the wicked.

Although our government must maintain impressive armed forces as the price of survival, these policies would help safeguard the principle of civil control: (1) the choice of especially capable and articulate National Security Council members and service secretaries;¹⁷ (2) continuation of the civilian leadership of Central Intelligence; (3) nomination of military men to diplomatic and executive posts *only* when their personal qualifications are distinctly superior to those of all available civilians; (4) further strengthening of the non-military elements in such planning bodies of joint composition as National Security Council subcommittees and inter-departmental planning groups; (5) expansion of opportunities for younger officers to attend colleges and universities; (6) increased use of *ad hoc* civilian advisory commissions on national policy; and most important of all, (7) the acceptance by both political parties in Congress, *as far as pos-*

sible, of non-partisanship in military as well as foreign policy.¹⁸

Our people must acquire a better understanding of the military's place in policy-making and implementation. They should not only appreciate the present importance of strong armed forces, but also the long-term dangers of our unconsciously raising a regimented state in our democracy. We who are educators can contribute in three specific ways: (1) undertake research in the areas of politico-military problems, almost untouched except for a very few excellent books and such current studies as those by the Social Science Research Council, the Public Administration Clearing House, and the Brookings Institution; (2) set up new courses in this general area, as has been done at Princeton, Harvard, the University of Illinois, and the University of Minnesota; and (3) discuss military aspects fully and realistically in such courses as American government, international politics and foreign relations, as well as in public speeches.

Surely one of the most challenging problems of these crisis-laden times is the proper role of the military. It is an especially puzzling question in the field of foreign relations, for foreign policy and military power and potential must remain in balance. At the same time civil control cannot be abdicated. We have only begun to grasp the magnitude of the dilemma noted by the late Lord Lindsay of Birker: "... the difficulties in the control of armed forces by a democracy illustrate the problem of the democratic control of power in its most acute form. . . ."¹⁹

¹⁸*The New York Times*, 22 April, 1953, p. 1.

¹⁹A. D. Lindsay, *The Modern Democratic State*, pp. 283-84.

¹⁷J. Fischer, "Mr. Truman's Politburo," *Harpers*, CCII (June, 1951), 31.

WAS THERE A WHITE SURVIVOR OF CUSTER'S COMMAND?

BY HENRY S. MERRICK*

THE three-quarter century old controversy whether there were white survivors of Custer's command at the Battle of the Little Big Horn (Cos. C, E, F, I, & L, 7th US Cav.) has been revived by Kathryn Wright's article, "Custer's Last Man" in the July 1955 issue of *Guns* (542 N. Dearborn, Chicago). This author had previously written on the subject in the *Billings* (Montana) *Gazette*, on June 23, 1947, but general attention was not called to the claim of Frank Finkel, as a survivor, until Dr. Charles Kuhlman published *Legend into History* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole Co., 1951). In note 56, p. 229, he states that he is "convinced that a trooper named Frank Finkle" of Co. C did escape. Finkle first made the claim in an address before the Dayton, (Washington) Kiwanis Club in 1921, largely as a result of urging by his wife.

In a review of Dr. Kuhlman's book (*Military Affairs* XVI 3) in the sattement, "There was no Frank Finkel in Co. C. There was for several years Corporal, afterwards Sergeant, August Finkle, who is listed as killed in the battle." His body was identified by his fellow sergeant of Co. C, Daniel Kanipe, who had been detached by General Custer, thereby escaping the battle, and who could hardly be mistaken.¹ Proponents of the Frank Finkel claim answer this by stating he was a different man and had enlisted original-

ly as a minor under the name of Frank Hall. On reaching his majority, a few months later, he reverted to his real name, was not a sergeant but a trooper and sometimes acting corporal.² Neither name appears on the Company muster or pay rolls prior to the battle.³

In the files of the Oshkosh (Wisconsin) Museum is a comprehensive study by Dr. Kuhlman of this case, based on information furnished largely by Mrs. Hermie C. Billmeyer, Frank Finkle's second wife. The evidence, while strong, is not conclusive. Nevertheless, Frank Finkle's story of his escape is as thrilling and as unbelievable as any coming out of the Indian country. Wounded himself, his horse was hit and bolted through the dismounted Indians who could not stop him, but who inflicted additional wounds.

Succored by two "bandits" he finally recovered enough to report that fall (1876) at Fort Benton where his story was discredited and discharge refused unless he could produce two witnesses.⁴ Some sources charge he was jailed as a deserter but escaped.⁵ All accounts agree he stowed away on a Missouri River steamer,⁶ was discovered, and allowed to work his passage to civilization. Why he did not report at Fort Lincoln when the steamer reached there is inexplicable and the weakest spot in his story, since the 7th Cavalry had already returned there, to its

*Lt. Colonel Merrick is a member of the editorial staff of *Military Affairs* and Historian of the Order of Indian Wars.

¹"The Story of Sergeant Kanipe, One of Custer's Messengers." *Greensboro* (N. C.) *Daily Record*, April 27, 1924; *The Custer Myth*, p. 250; and Graham, 1953.

²Study by Dr. Charles Kuhlman of the Finkel evidence in Oshkosh (Wis.) Museum. Hereafter Finkel Evidence.

³An examination was made in the National Archives.

⁴Kathryn Wright. *Guns*, July 1955, p. 49. Hereafter Wright.

⁵Finkel Evidence.

⁶*Ibid.* and Wright.

home station.⁷ In extenuation of Finkel's action it is claimed he was young (nearly 23 and therefore no child), comparatively uneducated (although he had a common school education in Ohio before enlisting), and a stolid introvert who did not appreciate the importance of clearing his military record.⁸

⁷Finkel Evidence.

⁸*Ibid.*

Frank Finkel became a successful farmer near Dayton, Washington, as evidenced by the fact he sold his holdings for \$40,000.00 prior to his retirement.⁹

To conclude, the above evidence and Dr. Kuhlman's acceptance of it, while impressive, does not prove the claim of Frank Finkel to be a survivor, to this writer's satisfaction.

⁹*Ibid.*

HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE ADDENDA

CENTURY OF THE VICTORIA CROSS

On January 29, 1956, the Victoria Cross achieved its one hundredth birthday. Queen Victoria created it when other decorations for gallantry in the Crimean War seemed inadequate for some of the deeds of cold heroism performed. Since the Royal Warrant of 1856, only 1,344 men have won the famed decoration. The medal, said to have been designed by the Prince Consort, has always been struck by a London firm from the metal guns captured at Sebastopol. The earliest V.C. still living is Major The Earl of Dunmore, who won it in 1897. The latest award was made, posthumously, to Lieutenant P. K. E. Curtis, who won it while attached to the famous Gloucesters in Korea on December 1, 1953. About four hundred members of the V.C. élite are living today, scattered over all parts of the British Commonwealth and of North America.

NAVAL HISTORICAL FOUNDATION ANNUAL MEETING

The annual meeting of the Naval Historical Foundation was held at the Decater House Museum, Jackson Square, Washington, D. C., 20 January 1956. Commodore Dudley W. Knox presided in place of Fleet Admiral W. D. Leahy who was unable to

attend. Reports were received from the various officers: Secretary, Commander Edward S. Moale, USN, Ret.; Treasurer, Rear Admiral Edward J. Foy; Curator, Rear Admiral John B. Heffernan; chairman of Fund Raising and Lectures, Vice Admiral John F. Shafroth; and chairman of Reproductions, Captain Charles Bittinger. The Treasurer reported the healthy condition of the finances. Partly due to the appreciation of investments there was a gain in net worth of nearly \$24,000 to a total of \$146,180. Operating expenses including salaries were approximately \$11,500. The Curator reported the receipt of a number of valuable documents and artifacts, as well as a steady increase in Museum visitors, averaging 125 daily. Fleet Admiral Leahy was reelected president, and Commodore Knox, Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, and Real Admiral J. A. Furer were elected vice presidents.

CURRENT HISTORY

The editorial in the winter 1955 number of *MILITARY AFFAIRS*, "Needed—A Uniform Current History Program," has brought forth some serious comment by Dr. Harry Yoshpe, chief Transportation Corps historian, which we hope to publish in our next issue.

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THE MILITARY LIBRARY

Editor: GEORGE J. STANSFIELD

REVIEWS

Air Power, by Asher Lee (New York: Praeger, 1955:. Pp. 200. \$3.75)

The author who wrote such splendid volumes on the German Air Force and the Soviet Air Force has now tackled the whole subject of air power. This is an interesting survey of all classifications of air power, starting with a chapter on strategic bombing, which Asher Lee rightfully considers the heart of air power, and ending with a chapter on "The Future."

Air Power is chock full of valuable technical data, the product of the trained analytical mind of a top-flight intelligence officer. He need not have access to classified documents to reveal the status of world air power. By painstaking study of published information he is able to deduce a most accurate picture of the entire field and its direction of progress.

It is regretful that *Air Power* contains neither an index nor a bibliography, because with these study aids it could become a most valuable reference book. In any event, military scholars and laymen alike will find it worth reading. Asher Lee is most careful to document much of his material in context, however, which will be helpful to the student.

The book falls short in its speculation of the tactical and strategic roles of air power in war. The problem of the H-bomb seems too formidable to grasp, and so Asher Lee makes his task easy by postulating that H-bombs will not be employed. Moreover, he implies that A-bombs will not significantly alter the conduct of air war. Hence he can review World War Two, add improved equipment, and come up with World War Two and a Half.

Asher Lee's failure to assess adequately the effect of nuclear weapons on air war leads him to a number of rather unrealistic conclusions. The most glaring one is his faith in air defense. The defensive success of the Battle of Britain still looms as an example which he believes might be repeated. This is only possible, of course, by eschewing the atom, which seems too remote a possibility to consider.

The author, through his profound knowledge of the air aspect of World War Two has made some rather startling analyses which will be of interest to historians. One is that the air invasion of Crete was a tactical success but a strategic blunder. A tactical success because the objective was achieved, but a strategic failure because the objective was valueless to Germany. Crete was not necessary as a base to harass British Mediterranean shipping. The Luftwaffe could do this adequately, as demonstrated, from Italian and Balkan bases. Whereas the capture of Crete depleted and tried the German Air Force to such a degree that its effectiveness in the initial invasion of Russia a few weeks later was critically impaired. Thus Russia was not subdued by a blitz that could have been possible with fully effective German air power.

In the next to last chapter, a sound plea is made for more extensive air intelligence, including a case for more recognition of intelligence officers. Better intelligence, argues the author, will pay off many fold in more appropriate target selection and enemy assessment. The most cogent argument for enhanced intelligence, however, is not emphasized. This is that supersonic speeds combined with

nuclear explosives increases the danger of surprise by astronomical proportions. A nation's very life may now rest on the effectiveness of its intelligence.

Asher Lee accurately sees the losses in national defense caused by armies, navies, and air forces working at cross purposes, and he proposes a novel solution which would merit further investigation by those who have responsibilities in this area.

He proposes that the three services be combined above and including the rank of colonel, navy captain, or group captain. These eagle-and-star-rank officers would go into a distinct and common uniform, different from their mother services, and henceforth be promoted by the "Defense Staff"—a proposed Supreme General Staff organization. A new and common system of rank above eagle rank would likewise be established.

Senior service officers must come to realize that the most effective defense of their nation is their sacred duty. Loyalty to certain weapons or to a medium or employment, or to a particular service are false guides. Unless senior service officers close ranks with common and noble purposes for national security regardless of service interests, our country cannot expect optimum protection. Asher Lee's suggestion appears to present a workable solution to this national dilemma which is evident in both the U.K. and the U.S.

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The United States and World Sea Power.

Edited by E. B. Potter. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1955. Pp. 963. \$11.75)

NOTE: The authors of this book are twelve professors at the Naval academy. It is now being used for instruction of midshipmen at the Naval Academy and for Naval ROTC units. It was, however, conceived and written as a private enterprise by the authors and was without official sanction, control, or promise of adoption.

This is the most comprehensive one volume work on sea power yet written. It covers the origins of sea power in the Mediterranean, its transfer to the Atlantic with the coming of the sailing warship, and its global nature in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The authors have

had to depend on secondary sources for a work of this character and the attention given to various phases of maritime operations reflects the stress that other naval writers have given them. As would be expected the golden age of British sea power is adequately covered but only a few pages is devoted to the important beginnings of the English Navy in the time of Cromwell when both the modern naval profession and the tactics of the battle line were created. Only a page is given to the thousand-year survival of Byzantium through the use of sea power in the Black and Mediterranean Seas.

The authors had to present a history of the United States Navy as well as that of sea power as a whole. They have done well in this difficult task. U. S. naval history is included as part of naval power and both are placed in the setting of world history. Naval operations of the War of the Revolution, the Quasi-War with France, and the War of 1812 are all considered as parts of England's long struggle with France. On the other hand, the naval history of World War II is largely that of the U. S. Navy.

This book does bring out one point that may come as a surprise to many who, because of the difficulties with post-war unification, may have thought that there has always been a lack of cooperation between the armed services of the United States. Actually the U. S. Navy has a well established tradition of working with the Army in all its wars from 1812 to 1917. After Trafalgar the British Navy took several years to learn its new role when control of the seas had been gained. After Leyte, the Trafalgar of World War II, the U. S. Navy knew exactly that its new job was placing and maintaining the Army and the Air Force in position to bring about the complete defeat of Japan.

The authors were unable to present adequately the strategic influence of sea power in peacetime or the close connection that it has with international law. The chapters on technical development and the evolution of doctrine between wars are good but too short. These limitations reflect the dearth of monograph material and point out the many areas in the history of sea power that still need attention.

The editing of this work is outstanding. The writing is good and the narrative always interesting. For a book with so many authors, the continuity of text and the similarity in style is notable. The authors generalize just sufficiently to

keep events from being judged out of their historical context. The book has 193 maps and diagrams effectively illustrating the text. In this respect, it is a refreshing exception to the current practice of publishing military books without these essential aids. The fifteen-page bibliography, arranged by chapters, gives a comprehensive listing of naval literature. The index is limited mostly to personalities, battles, and ships names, and omits such tangible items in sea power as weapons, ship construction, and naval education and legislation.

This is a book that officers of all military services can read with profit, especially those attending the various war colleges. It should also be background reading in colleges and universities for students concentrating on international affairs, British or American history, and on any aspect of military history.

In summary, this work shows that Americans still hold to the teaching of their fellow countryman, Alfred Thayer Mahan, that the oceans form a great Common, open to all who would use it to good purpose and that Sea Power is world wide both in its extent and in its meaning.

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The Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. 6, *Men and Planes*, edited by Wesley F. Craven and James Lee Cate. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 1955. Pp. 809. lii \$8.50)

Unlike its predecessors in the Army Air Forces series, which deal principally with combat operations in the war theaters, *Men and Planes* takes up activities in the Zone of the Interior. Section I, "The Organization and its Responsibilities," contains four chapters on three themes. The first two chapters by William A. Goss are devoted to the origins and the changing organization of the AAF as it grew under the pressure of war. The third, by Gross and P. Alan Bliss, is the only portion of the book dealing with operations, in this case the air defense of the United States. In the fourth, Frank Futrell writes of the acquisition and construction of bases and other facilities. Section II, "Equipment and Supplies" by Alfred Goldberg, gives us a monograph length description of the AAF's materiel activities from research and development through procurement and production to distribution and maintenance. In

Section III, Arthur R. Kooker and Thomas H. Greer have likewise prepared what in reality is a monograph on recruitment and training. The volume has little organic unity except that the events described were taking place simultaneously in the United States. There are appended to the text copious notes, a useful list of AAF staff and command assignments, a glossary of abbreviations, and the index. Illustrations are scattered strategically through the volume, and the editors have supplied a summary of the text in what must be one of the longest forewords on record.

Except for Futrell's chapter on basic development, which seems rather shorter than the topic merits, the authors treat their subjects fully and, on the whole, with clarity. Anyone, wishing to learn how to build an air force, World War II style, can find ample instructions in *Men and Planes*. Even though the outline has long been familiar, the reader cannot help being impressed once again with what a remarkable accomplishment it was, all the more amazing when one remembers that the nation was at the same time creating a navy second to none and ground forces equal to any in the world.

The approach to the various topics is narrative and descriptive rather than analytical and critical. Enough background is given in each case to understand the pre-war situation usually going back to about 1935. The problems encountered in each stage of expansion are defined, and the solutions adopted explained. The authors have not hesitated to point out errors when they occurred but have not dwelt upon them. In other instances sufficient information is given for the reader to form his own opinion that some things might have been better done another way. The real value of *Men and Planes* is that it presents the material and leaves the drawing of lessons to others.

This reviewer was impressed by two general themes that he encountered repeatedly in the different sections. First was the drive toward independence that colored attitudes and influenced decisions throughout the war. The second was the very great importance of the period from outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939 to Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Particularly after the fall of France in June 1940, events moved very rapidly. It was in this period that the first sizeable increments of personnel were enrolled and their training commenced. The planes with

which victory was won were designed and put into production. The aircraft industry made the transition from handwork to mass production. Base programs were launched that assured construction of the facilities to accommodate the planes and train the men. The Army Air Corps became the Army Air Forces. It was an era of growing pains. Mistakes were plentiful, but on that fateful Sunday in December 1941, the AAF was ready to shift into high gear.

It is a sobering thought that we shall probably never have such a period in the future to make our preparations. In all likelihood we shall be plunged into hostilities from the first hours as we were in Korea. This fact alone justifies the United States in maintaining the largest military forces in its peacetime history and adopting policies to assure the readiness of the mobilization base.

The additional danger that the country may be directly attacked lends interest to the chapter on air defense in World War II. Perhaps the experience was non-conclusive because actual danger was slight, but the problems encountered are worth study. It may also come as a surprise to some readers to learn that the Japanese put aircraft over the West Coast and dropped at least one bomb on United States soil. They also launched a missile attack in the form of balloons with incendiary devices that arrived in this country in considerable numbers, without, however, inflicting serious damage. Whether these balloons were guided missiles or pilotless aircraft, this reviewer leaves up to the experts in such matters. It is perhaps unfair to criticize the editors and authors for not doing what they had no intention of doing in the first place. Their frame of reference, however, seems unnecessarily narrow. *Men and Planes* tells the story of General Arnold's air forces. It treats only in the most cursory manner Arnold's work as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or his relations with General Marshall and the civilian secretariat of the War Department. No one reading the volume could learn what were the duties and achievements of the Assistant Secretary of War for Air. The complex inter-relationships of AAF with naval aviation are slighted as the two exchanged technical information, engaged in cross-purchasing, competed for the same resources in manpower and materials, and made common stand in the interest of aviation against other elements of the defense pro-

gram. On other levels strict adherence to matters of AAF cognizance leads to curious results. In the discussion of research and development, for example, radar is omitted because it was a responsibility of the Signal Corps. As a study of aviation in the Army during World War II, *Men and Planes* is incomplete.

Perhaps like the mature Candide, the contributors have shown wisdom in cultivating just their cabbages, for they have done it very well. The volume is a worthy addition to the series of which it is a part. It writes another valuable chapter in the story of how the armed forces were raised, trained, and equipped during World War II.

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The War Economy, 1939-1942 Vol. III, of Australia in the War of 1939-1945, by S. J. Butlin (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1955. Pp. 516. 25 S.)

To students of American mobilization problems this and companion volumes in the series entitled "Australia in the War of 1939-45" will present many points of common reference. A second volume by the same author covering the second half of World War II, is in course of preparation. Of the 15 chapters, the first nine cover, in almost excessive detail, the situation preceding actual hostilities in the Pacific with the Japanese invasion of Malaya and Pearl Harbor. The Menzies (conservative) government continued in control until just before the Pacific War began, when Premier Curtin and his Labour Party took over; the change was occasioned in large measure by the proposal of a far-reaching taxation program in which the Commonwealth sought to supersede the local States' levies, and impose a "National Contribution." This last was a levy on personal wealth, to be offset by credits for State and Federal taxes.

While the Labour government was able to deliver the goods in short order, it was largely due to the preparations made by its predecessor. Politically-psychologically, the people were not ready, prior to the Japanese attack on Malaya, to accept strict governmental economic controls. By contrast, however, there was no parallel reluctance to join up with the armed forces. This experience was shared by several, if not all, of the allied powers, and would appear to indicate that there has been built into western culture a rejection by

the individual of any interference with his economic freedoms. He has been taught that as a trader he may pursue his advantage with a minimum of governmental restraints; as a consumer, he can dispose of his income as he chooses. Nevertheless, at the same time, the individual accepts without question the right of the community to requisition his person or his life in the national interest.

One problem unique to members of the British Commonwealth was the difficulty of adjusting their economy to that of the United Kingdom. As early as the Imperial Conference of 1937 they were warned to be self-sufficient in the matter of munitions. Australian prewar production of steel ingots exceeded one million tons, but much of this was exported for fabrication, while tool steels were largely imported. Zinc, lead, tin, were produced in sufficient quantity to answer local peacetime needs, with an exportable surplus. Accordingly, fabrication facilities for all metals had to be erected. One of the major problems was the maintenance of a satisfactory sterling balance, and this depended not only on the ability to make delivery to Britain, but on her willingness to accept Australian shipments of wheat, meat, wool and canned fruits. When the United Kingdom found sources of supply nearer home, or considered that in an austerity program they could not be imported, unemployment and economic recession were threatened. In the case of some less essential items, Britain would take delivery, but would not allocate space in any ships under her control. Accordingly, the Australian authorities made vigorous attempts to secure other than British-controlled tonnage for these commodities.

Inland transport presented a problem due to gaps in the rail net and the differences in gauges. Construction of strategic new lines and the solution of gauge difficulties was the subject of vast disagreement between civilian and military authorities. At the conclusion of the period covered by this volume, many vital solutions had yet to be found.

Allocation of manpower between civilian industry and the armed services, and between essential and non-essential industry was handled in a manner similar to our own, and provides an excellent cross-section of Australian war planning. By the end of 1941 there evolved the Manpower Priority Board, which had to advise on the "larger issues of policy," and from it evolved the Manpower

Directorate. This was paralleled by the U. S. War Manpower Commission. The Australian Manpower Directorate was concerned with reserving skills for essential production; the U. S. Commission went further into directing workers into essential employment and reducing turnover. It was, however, less active than the Australian counterpart in keeping necessary skills from the armed forces, but then these finally required a much larger slice of available male power.

Generally speaking, this volume presents ample documentary evidence to reveal the initial lag in preparedness which is typical of democratic peoples; it also reveals the swifter acceptance by governments of the realities of rationing and controls.

A people convinced that its birthright is freedom of economic choice will not easily surrender it for a mess of regulatory pottage, even though in practice these freedoms are more restricted than we realize.

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The French Theory of the Nation in Arms 1866-1939, by Richard D. Challener (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. Pp. 305. \$4.50)

The present work is a scholarly post-mortem on the defects of the French military theory called the "Nation-in-Arms." The author, a member of the Princeton history department, adjudges that along with other weaknesses inherent in the French political and economic system, the rigidity and unreality of the premises in its military theory played a contributory role in causing the June 1940 *débâcle*. But like the careful historic inquest it is, the book cumulates evidence from three generations of "Nation-in-Arms" policy to point its indictment. Sources are marshalled and sifted for trends from the defeat of the "White Coats" at Sadowa (Köinggratz) in 1866 to the ignominious capitulation at Compiègne in 1940. It is the sorry story of French leadership learning its military lessons too late.

Professor Challener's treatment may be grouped into three sections. First, a tightly written historic prologue of two chapters covering the forty-eight years after Sadowa wherein the professional long-term army was replaced by the popular short-term force. Second, a more discursive

examination of economic and political materials from 1914 to 1928 of three chapters. This appears to contain the author's principal analysis as to the defects of the "Nation-in-Arms" concept. The economic shortcomings of war theory are explored in chapter three. The following two chapters treat the lethargic fashion in which post-war France undertook, first, military reform and then the gearing of the civilian economy to the war effort. Third, the tragic dénouement from 1928-1940 is covered in the concluding two chapters. In the words of the author, "The war fought and lost in 1939-40 was in large part in its military phase a test of the military theories expounded and put into operation in the first decade after the Armistice of 1918" (pp. 215-16).

What fatal flaws did our military analyst ascertain in French military theory? At least six ways in which the content of French military theory was deficient were set forth in the terminal chapter. First, the French mass popular army, composed largely of reservists, did not constitute a sufficient force-in-being to repel a sudden Nazi attack. Since its strength could not be attained except by full mobilization, France was forced to yield in the matter of Rhineland reoccupation in March 1936 and to mobilize in 1939 when war was declared on Poland to shield its own border some months later. Second, Flandin's policy of appeasement was supported by the inability of the French Army to execute national policy and by the belief that national resources would not permit embarking on war. Third, French military thought was in a state of eclipse. The author dwelt at length upon the lack of vitality and virility in French military theory. The doctrine of war was defensive because France possessed a popular reservist army. Pétain's teaching of supremacy of fire-power on behalf of defense, learned at Verdun, dominated military reflection. Meanwhile, both the legislature and the public were apathetic toward military reform. But most fatefully of all, top generals such as Gamelin, Weygand, and Debeney espoused the defensive. Fourth, rejecting the counsel of De Gaulle who urged creating a small mobile professional army, it was believed that the days of the offensive were over. Because mass armies would tend to fill all the space, there would be no opportunity to manoeuvre and a 1914-18 stalemate would ensue. Fifth, the French leaders, reversing their position of 1914, now stressed machines over men and

morale. This led them to confuse potential with war strength-in-being. Sixth, and finally, most everyone believed the war would be a prolonged one permitting French factories to build up their inferior stockpiles of war material. But all six premises proved to be false in the spring and summer of 1940. French doctrines had failed to envisage any alternatives so that the nation's collapse was moral as well as military.

The author's handling of his abundant sources seems judicious and fair. His ability to plow through the most tedious and obdurate of materials—parliamentary hearings and debates—deserves special commendation. The reviewer would cavil only occasionally with some of the value judgments in initial chapters. It caused some consternation to see such basically different types of military thinkers as Georges Gilbert, Ferdinand Foch, and Jean L. A. Colin bracketed together as protagonists of the mass army (p. 50). The writer believes that Captain Gilbert remained until his death in 1902 an ardent defender of *armée de métier*, while Foch was unable to draw significant tactical and strategic conclusions from his lip service to Clausewitz and Von der Goltz. On the sources of J. Jaurès, *L'Armée nouvelle* in footnote 47, p. 71, in addition to Engels and the Swiss militia, there was the much closer-at-hand work of Theodore Jung, *La guerre et la révolution: Du Bois-Crancé* 2 Vols. (1884).

The student of comparative military institutions cannot abstain from the observation that reservist formations also provided a majority of the war strength in the nineteenth century Austrian and Prussian armies. But the doctrines of war, the nature of their respective officer corps, monarchist government, and political parties precluded their reservist echelons from having the deleterious military effect it did in twentieth-century France. In a word, the growth of reservist units in a modern army is an independent variable which has produced baneful consequences only in the single instance of France among the great powers. His analysis leads the reviewer to believe that the essential flaw of the "Nation-in-Arms" concept resided not in its reliance on popular conscription, but upon inadequate training, unreal war doctrine, and poor coordination of the economy to war planning.

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Bohemian Brigade: Civil War Newsmen in Action. By Louis M. Starr. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954. Pp. xvii, 367, xix. Map and photographs. \$5.00)

The North Reports the Civil War. By J. Cutler Andrews. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1955. Pp. x, 813. Maps and plates. \$6.00)

The typical Civil War reporter was young, sound of limb, and resourceful. He had to be if he were to be successful, for he had to face not only the hazards of hard campaigning, but he had to evade guerillas and beat his rivals to the nearest telegraph office, where frequently he had to fool the censor. He might even carry his dispatches to the editorial office in person. Sometimes his news of a battle would be the first news anybody, including the President and the Secretary of War, would have. Upon other occasions a printed letter or dispatch might result in his arrest as a spy.

There were, of course, both good and bad reporters, but both volumes under review agree their net product was good. There were 500 Northern reporters by one estimate, whereas the tablet at South Mountain lists 106 writers and sixteen artists who followed the Union armies (Confederate reporters were negligible), according to Bernard A. Weisberger, whose lively *Reporters for the Union* (1953) enjoys the distinction of being the first volume of its kind. Andrews identifies over 300 Northern reporters, while Starr says that "perhaps two hundred were full-time."

The conventional charge against the Bohemian Brigade, as the scribes liked to style themselves, is that they damaged the Union cause by revealing information to the enemy. It is interesting that as this is written there comes the announcement that Emmett Crozier's forthcoming *Yankee Reporters, 1861-1865* (Oxford), will deal especially with this charge, arguing that the Bohemians' service in the cause of morale outbalanced any injury they inflicted. What do Starr and Andrews say on this score?

They both observe that the enemy gained military information from the Northern press, but while not condoning this, Starr views the steady flow of news which the Bohemians produced as making an "enormous contribution" to Northern morale. Pointing out that Lincoln called the Civil War "a people's war," Starr declares that the Bohemians made it just that by disseminating war

news to every corner of the land and finally establishing "the right to report" by beating the censors "by rail, by mail, by messenger, by artifice, by cipher, and by enlisting higher authority." The winning of this right he correctly views as vital to democratic society.

Andrews, observing that "the censorship was haphazard at best," concludes that the leakage of military information through the press "was well-nigh scandalous," but he places the blame largely upon the editors rather than the reporters. In sum, it is his view that "the blood-soaked battlefields . . . ; the dingy telegraph offices . . . ; the guerilla-infested country between . . . ; and the poorly-lighted editorial rooms, . . . were the proving grounds for distinguished journalism, both during the war and in the years to come."

Starr says his most compelling reason for studying the Bohemians was "to illuminate the effects of war upon the development of journalism." In our opinion he provides distinctive illumination in a most fetching volume, the scheme of which is an exploration of the many facets of wartime reporting with the difficulties of the *New York Tribune* providing the thread on which to string the narrative.

Professor Andrews' method in *The North Reports the Civil War* is to present a chronological view of the entire war through the eyes of its journalists, often by quoting them, by providing analyses of their reporting, and by spicing the account with anecdotes, some of which do not have quite the Weisberger flavor. This enables him to give considerable attention to naval as well as land reporting. His book is well-written.

Starr's footnotes are modest by design, whereas Andrews' much more complete documentation runs for ninety-one pages following the text, where it is awkward to use. Andrews' bibliography is more impressive than Starr's, which is probably accounted for by the fact that Andrews' research extended over a decade (with time out for the war), whereas Starr drudged away for a mere five years. Thus the professor used forty manuscript collections against Starr's sixteen and sixty-three newspaper files against Starr's twenty-four. In addition, Andrews used important Navy and War Department files in The National Archives, while Starr ferreted out the Gay Papers and the manuscript of the Cadwallader diary, which was recently published. Andrews' index, like Starr's, is average.

These are valuable studies and may be read together with profit, although a person with a serious interest in history will probably appreciate them more than the hobbyist who, seeking escape into a romantic vacuum, prefers dashing accounts of generals and battles rather than less spectacular but more socially significant fare.

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The Power of Personality in War. By Maj. Gen. Baron Hugo von Freytag-Loringhoven, translated by Col. Oliver L. Spaulding. (Harrisburg: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1955. Pp. 167. \$3.00)

General Freytag-Loringhoven's little book on leadership, which first appeared in 1905, is considered a classic by American officers familiar with the German language and by military men of Germany as well. Col. Oliver L. Spaulding, the distinguished American military historian, translated the book into English. The publisher has rendered a real service by making his translation available to the Army.

Freytag-Loringhoven pioneered the teaching of military leadership by the applicatory method. A modified method, troop-leading problems, was used in the service schools and the Command and General Staff College of the United States Army for many years. In the years before World War II many students at the Staff College believed the detailed accounting for all the actions and movements of "General A" something of a waste of time and effort. They referred to the exercises as "bed-time stories." Later, in actual war, at least one found this instruction of great value.

Freytag-Loringhoven was a great admirer of Von Clausewitz and extracted material concerning leadership from his book *On War*. He arranged this material systematically in the text and expanded and illustrated it with examples drawn from European history. The result is an outstanding and penetrating book on the art of leadership in war. This classic is worthy of a place on any troop leader's bookshelf. Like all classics it should be read and reread from time to time.

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Gordon of Khartoum: The Life of General Charles George Gordon. By Lord Elton. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955. Pp. 376. \$6.00.)

Lord Elton has written an interesting biography of a man whom he describes as "one of the last, and one of the strangest, in a long line of British eccentrics." Charles George Gordon or "Chinese Gordon," to give him the name that has survived the passage of time since the Taiping Rebellion, was truly a strange man. In many ways, his actions are incomprehensible to the modern day reader, and yet, the character of the man holds one with a compelling fascination.

Quite evidently, this compulsive fascination seized Lord Elton as he read through Gordon's voluminous correspondence. The author was able to exploit hitherto unused private collections and his work might be considered a definitive distillation of those letters. However, in common with most other biographers of Gordon, Lord Elton concerned himself primarily with the spiritual life of the man and painted the background of his times and the details of his military life with a very broad brush. As a result, he fails to provide sufficient military background and continuity to make Gordon a real person.

There is no reasoned examination of Gordon's method of organizing, training, and leading his troops. Compelling eyes, a magnetic personality, and an absolute lack of fear are not enough to qualify a man as "the greatest living commander of irregulars," and yet, that seems to be the author's sole explanation of Gordon's phenomenal success. The narrative is not only strikingly bereft of details on armament, equipment, and tactics of the "Ever Victorious Army," but equally lacking in military particulars of the Taiping forces. The same situation holds true in regard to the Egyptian and Sudanese troops led by Gordon and their Arab and Mahdian opponents.

Gordon was on duty in England during the period of the Cardwell reforms which completely changed the character of the British Army, but none of this is touched on by Lord Elton. Perhaps it did not concern Gordon?

There is too much of the "soldier saint" and not enough of the soldier in *Gordon of Khartoum* to recommend the book to people whose primary interest is in Gordon's military life and achievements.

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SHORT REVIEWS

ALBION, ROBERT G.: *Maritime and Naval History: An annotated bibliography*, rev. ed. (Mystic, Conn.: The Marine Historical Association, 1955. Pp. 94. \$2.00)

Dr. Albion, former Institute President, is Gardener Professor of Oceanic History and Affairs at Harvard University and coordinator, Munson Institute of American Maritime History at Mystic.

Originally appearing in 1951, this edition is limited primarily to books in English but it has increased from 1,000 to 1,800 entries. The five major categories are: reference works; ships and men; maritime science, exploration, colonization; commerce and shipping; and navies (ancient to World War II).

The last section of special topics indicates maritime historical journals. It is regretted that few foreign books or periodical articles could be included in this compilation, but this section indicates the scope of the noted journals. (There is an eight-page index of authors.) Most journals are covered by Dr. Albion in the *American Neptune* bibliography indicated on page 1.

The use of an * indicates particularly valuable works and the annotations run in length from a few lines to a long paragraph.

This is a most valuable compilation for anyone interested in the field of military history and is a must for the individual scholar's own library.

ATAMON, SARKIS: *The Armenian Community*. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. Pp. 479. \$4.75)

This is a critical and analytical study of the cultural development of the Armenians during the past century by an American scholar. Their history in Europe and America to the present is narrated and is especially important in connection with Soviet Russia's "Soviet Armenia."

AYCOCK, WILLIAM B. and W. WURFEL: *Military Law under the Uniform Code of Military Justice*. (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1955. Pp. 430. \$7.50)

A collection of the fundamental body of military case law based upon the 1951 Uniform Code of Military Justice and *The Manual of Court Martial United States*, to afford a ready reference for the military lawyer or the civilian practitioner in military justice case.

Chapter I, pages 3 to 15, contains a brief "Historical Background."

CHAPEL, CHARLES EDWARD: *The Gun Collectors Handbook of Values*; 3rd, rev. ed. (New York: Coward, McCann, 1955. Pp. 398. \$9.00)

This edition gives 1955 market values for over two thousand American and foreign firearms. In addition to detailed descriptions, 48 plates illustrate 600 arms selected upon the basis of their popularity with average collectors representing most pistols and revolvers made in the U. S. from colonial days to the present. A brief bibliography supplements each chapter's historical introduction.

The historian and the collector of weapons will find this work of great reference value; indeed, it has been a standard work since its first publication in 1940.

CREASEY, SIR EDWARD S.: *Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World*. (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Co., 1955. Pp. 471. \$3.00)

The original 15 battles are reprinted, incorporating the contributions of Robert H. Murry who edited the 1943 Military Service edition, which had added 9 battles not included in this edition. It is an attractive version of a "military classic" thus available for those who do not already own a "Creasey."

FISHWICK, MARSHALL W.: *American Heroes, Myth and Reality*. (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1954. Pp. 242. \$3.75)

Two heroes: "E Pluribus Unum: George Washington" and "The Lost Cause: Robert E. Lee" are particularly important to the military historian since they describe U. S. attitudes toward these two great military leaders. It is a most stimulating volume worthy of examination.

FRY, MAJOR GENERAL J. C., USA: *Assault Battle Drill*. Foreword by Lt. General Gavin. (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Co., 1955. Pp. 114. \$2.50).

Planned as effective guide for combat readiness training, it reflects the experiences of General Fry as Commanding General, 2d Infantry Division in Korea. The military historian will also be interested in the Appendix, "One Week in Hell," describing the author's 350th Infantry Regiment's

defense of Battaglia in World War II, first appearing in the *Saturday Evening Post* in 1949.

Recommended as an authoritative tactical guide-book.

HENRY, THOMAS A.: *Wilderness Messiah*, the Story of Hiawatha and the Iroquois. (New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1955. Pp. 285. \$4.00)

An interpretation of the Iroquois, their talent for government, their ways in war, their conduct in family living and their religious beliefs. The real 15th century Hiawatha is a leading figure since he persuaded the five major tribes to reconcile their differences and create the first republic.

It is an outstanding contribution to our understanding of this group whose activities continued to be important even through World War II. Recommended especially for all those interested in our colonial history.

HOWARTH, DAVID: *We Die Alone*. (New York: Macmillan, 1955. Pp. 231. \$3.95)

A Book-of-the-Month selection describing the incredible true adventures of the Norwegian Jan Baalsrud and his eleven companion saboteurs in their World War II return to occupied Norway.

The English author was second in command of the base from which they sailed and pieced together the story of Baalsrud's single remarkable escape in visits to the scenes of the wartime events. Recommended as a narrative of great personal courage and victory of the spirit over the worst physical hardships and handicaps of the frozen North.

ILLINGWORTH, FRANK: *Highway to the North*. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. Pp. 293. \$7.50)

A description of the author's journeys along the whole length of the Alaskan Highway from Mile Post Zero to Fairbanks, 1,500 miles away. This Yukon country volume has a brief introduction by Robert Service and presents a Briton's survey as of 1952-53. There are 16 pages of illustrations of this seldom-visited country. Recommended as a good travel volume.

JAY, K. E. B.: *Atomic Energy Research at Harwell*. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. Pp. 144. \$4.75)

The principal scientific officer since 1947 describes the work done at the U.K. Atomic Energy

Authority Research Establishment at Harwell from 1951 until August 1954 when the U.K. Energy authority took over from the Minister of Supply. This official history provides essential information for the historian as well as all those interested in the development of atomic energy.

LIVERPOOL, LORD RUSSEL OF: *The Scourge of the Swastika*, a short history of Nazi war crimes. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1954. Pp. 259. \$4.50)

The author was Deputy Judge Advocate General, British Army of the Rhine, being legal advisor to the Commander-in-chief in respect of all trials of German war criminals in the British zone of occupation. In 1954 he was "compelled to resign, because of his refusal to drop publication of this book," having served as Assistant Judge Advocate General from 1951.

It is a factual account, but without the most thorough documentation possible of these "appalling" crimes and the organization behind them. It should be of great value to the military historian concerned with the war in Europe.

NAMIER, SIR LEWIS: *Personalities and Powers*. (New York: Macmillan, 1955. Pp. 157. \$3.00)

This is a collection of essays by an eminent English historian. The most valuable for the military historian are the last three: "Diplomacy in the Inter-War Period 1919-1939" (a review of Craig's *The Diplomats*); "Hitler, a Study in Tyranny" (a review of this book); and "The Nemesis of Power" (a review of Wheeler-Bennett's careful study).

NICHOLSON, LT. COL. G. W. L.: *Marlborough and the War of the Spanish Succession*. (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1955. Pp. 168. Obtainable from supervisor of Government Publications, Department of Printing and Stationery, 75 cents.)

The author is Deputy Director, Historical Section, Army Headquarters, Ottawa. The volume includes maps drawn by Capt. C. C. J. Bond. It continues the high standards set by earlier publications of the same office. Documented, well-illustrated, with carefully drawn clear maps, it contains an appendix bibliography and a nine-page index.

Its value for the modern military historian is that it presents for the general military reader or civilian historian the essentials of the first of modern coalition wars, whose details otherwise are

scattered among the books in the bibliography and which cannot so clearly be seen as a whole in any other place.

Nicholson's book is especially recommended to those teaching courses in military history as well as to all military historians as an example of what can be done to bring an excellent military historical monograph out in a format and at a price suitable for a potentially wide audience.

OGG, DAVID: *England in the Reigns of James I and William III*. (New York: Oxford University Press, Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1955. Pp. 567. 50s, \$8.00)

This volume is designed as a sequel to the author's *England in the Reign of Charles II* first printed in 1934 and now revised. The period covered here is 1685 to 1702 and represents a real challenge to T. B. Macaulay's century-earlier interpretation of the history of the same period.

For the military historian the relations of the Army and Navy to the 1688 Revolution are clearly seen in context. In addition, the Irish Battle of the Boyne, 1690, and the Scotch Battle of Killiecrankie, 1689, as part of the revolution outside England, are also described.

The wars of William during 1689 to 1697 are discussed in detail in Chapters X to XIV as their titles clearly indicate:

- X "Material Resources for War: Industry and Trade"
- XI "Human Resources for War: Men and Institutions"
- XII "The War at Sea, 1689-92; Beachy Head, La Hogue"
- XIII "The War on Land and Sea, 1692-5; Steenkirk, Neerwinden, Naumur"
- XIV "The War to the Last Guinea, 1689-97; The National Debt: the Bank of England"

While there is no bibliography, the satisfactory index and table of contents indicate the wanted material and the footnotes clearly indicate the use of standard and recent detailed studies pertinent to this period such as J. Ehrmann, *The Navy in the War of William III*.

While requiring careful re-reading, this general history will continue to provide a most satisfactory and useful volume, one to be referred to by the students of English history as well as by those interested in the backgrounds of American military history.

PIZER, VERNON and DAVIS, PERRY HUME III: *Your Assignment Overseas*; a handbook for the serviceman and his family. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1955. Pp. 291. \$3.50)

Gives a good general idea of movement overseas not otherwise found in one cover. Valuable for reference, but current information must be procured locally since changes in procedures and forms occur often outdating details in any book.

PRESSLY, THOMAS J.: *Americans Interpret Their Civil War*. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1954. Pp. 347. \$5.00)

This is a careful study of the changing interpretations of the causes of the Civil War from 1861 to the present, primarily by American historians. In this sense it is concerned with political rather than military history and is very valuable as a pioneer study in summarizing the historiography of this great conflict.

Military historians, especially those concerned with this war, should become familiar with it in any case.

SNYDER, LOUIS L.: *The World in the Twentieth Century*. (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1955. Pp. 192. \$1.25)

"An Anvil Original" paperback by the Professor of History, City College of New York, it presents a brief text and 25 extracts from key documents of this period. It is a most succinct and yet satisfactory presentation for school use or for the general reader.

Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Fight for Freedom. (New York: United Committee of the Ukrainian-American organizations of New York, 1954. Pp. 223)

A collection of addresses, articles, short stories, and quotations dealing with this army in World War II as well as in postwar struggles between German and Russian forces. There is a one-page bibliography.

WENDT, GERALD: *Nuclear Energy and Its Uses in Peace*. (Paris: UNESCO, 1955. Pp. 76. 50 cents) (Available through New York: Columbia University Press, official agent.)

A brief survey of the peaceful uses of Atomic Energy.

ZORNOW, WILLIAM FRANK: *Lincoln and the Party Divided*. (Norman, Okla.: University of

Oklahoma Press, 1954. Pp. 254. \$4.00)

This is a scholarly study of how Lincoln used every resource of statesmanship, good fortune, and political acumen to reunite his party, to regain his prestige with the people, and to win their endorsement of his program in 1864.

FICTION

FORESTER, CECIL SCOTT: *The Good Shepherd*. (Boston: Little Brown, 1955. Pp. 310. \$3.95)

A Book-of-the-Month selection as well as being (reprinted in part in *Life*) it presents Commander Krause USN as the shepherd who conveys 37 allied merchantment through the submarine wolf-pack infested waters of the Atlantic in World War II. Seven of the convoy and one destroyer escort were lost in contrast to two probable and one possible German submarine losses. A battle with a submarine was fought on the surface. Forester's Krause is as good a combat leader as his better-known Hornblower. Enough said!

GROSSARD, SERGE: *A German Officer* (tr. Antonia White from the French). (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1955. Pp. 218. \$3.00)

This is the American edition of *Un Officier de Tradition* (1954) which depicts the life of a wounded ex-colonel of the Wehrmacht in post-war Germany with flashbacks to his wartime carrying out of duty without regard to the human elements involved. It is a very readable un pitying portrayal of his successes and failures and effects a Frenchman's interpretation of an average regular German officer.

LAGARD, GERALD: *Leaps the Live Thunder*. (New York: William Morrow, 1925. Pp. 256. \$3.50)

The author of the *Scarlet Cockrell* has written another unusual and readable novel describing the adventures of a member of General Forrest's troop, his cat Col. Turpentine, and his girl who is part of a travelling tent show owned by a third member of these three "Confederate" musketeers. Recommended as good reading.

SIMON, EDITH: *The Twelve Pictures*. (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1955. Pp. 367. \$3.95)

An amphibious retelling of the *Nibelungenlied* legends by a modern English novelist who has steeped herself in the confused, primitive world of

the fifth century, A.D., when the German tribes were fighting the Huns. It is not valuable reading for the military historian.

TREVOR, ELLESTON: *The Big Pick-up*, a novel of Dunkirk. (New York: Macmillan, 1955. Pp. 259. \$3.00)

This novel by an English professional writer has its focus on a small band of British soldiers caught forty miles from the sea and describes their adventures in reaching the beach and the waiting boats. By this technique the author has suggested the staggering immensity of the whole with relative success.

WHITE, LESLIE T.: *The Winged Sword*. (New York: William Morrow, 1955. Pp. 375. \$3.95)

A well known historical novelist has written another fast-paced tale concerning the adventures of Olivier, the Briton, in eleventh-century France and in the Holy Land on the First Crusade (1096). It is a thoroughly satisfying novel in which there is sufficient historical background yet in which background does not hamper the story's unfolding. Most readers will find it hard to put down before the finish, which cannot be said of most recent stories.

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The true story of a Korean horse which went through the war as an ammunition carrier for a Marine gun crew, coming out with the rank of sergeant and a special citation for bravery.

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Current Problems

"Britain's Changing Military Policy," by H. A. DeWeerd, in *Foreign Affairs*, October 1955.

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"The War Office Fifty Years Ago," by Major Maurice Caillard, in *Army Quarterly* (London), October 1955.

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"Pirogoff in the Crimean Campaign," by B. M. Fried, in *Bulletin, New York Academy of Medicine*, Vol. 31, 1955.

"When Warriors Prayed to the God of Battles," by Frank A. King, in *Army Quarterly* (London), October 1955.

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"Gunner Centenary in Canada," by Lt. Col. G. P. Marriott, in *Journal of the Royal Artillery*, October 1955.

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V. Weapons and Equipment

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HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

JOINT SESSION OF THE AHA AND AMI

The annual joint session of the American Historical Association and the American Military Institute was held at 10:00 A.M., 29 December 1955, in the Chinese Room of the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D. C. Witnesses agreed that this was one of the most successful meetings ever held by the AMI. The beautiful hall was comfortably filled with a couple of hundred eager auditors from academic groves all over the nation. The theme, "Civil-Military Relations: Historical Case Studies," was ably illustrated with three interesting papers: "The Elder Pitt and His Admirals and Generals," by Rev. Eric McDermott of Georgetown University; "1898: The United States in the Pacific," by Dr. Louis J. Halle of the University of Virginia; and "Conscription in Great Britain, 1900-1914: A Failure in Civil-Military Communications," by Professor Theodore Ropp of Duke University. Rear Admiral John D. Hayes, USN, Ret., President of the AMI, originated the program and acted as chairman and moderator for the meeting. The question and answer period following the presentation of the papers indicated very keen interest in the subject matter and in the particular illustrations cited. It is expected that the papers will be published in *Military Affairs*, XX, 2 (Summer 1956).

ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMI

Following the morning session at the Mayflower, the annual business meeting of the American Military Institute was held at 5:30 P.M., 29 December 1955, at the Army and Navy Club, Farragut Square, Washington. The meeting room was jammed with members from all parts of the country, many of

whom actively participated in an impressive discussion of the future plans and prospects of the Institute. The discussion was initiated by Brig. General Dale O. Smith, USAF, who, in extemporaneous remarks, proposed energetic efforts for vastly increased membership, endowments, and activities. Amongst those commenting favorably on General Smith's objectives were former trustee Dr. James Phinney Baxter, Brig. General Paul M. Robinett, and Dr. Donald W. Mitchell. Motion was made and passed that President Hayes appoint a committee to consider future plans and programs. On the back cover appear the names of the annual panel of six trustees who were elected at the meeting for the three-year term ending 31 December 1958. A delightful cocktail party, attended also by the wives of members, completed the proceedings.

ANNUAL MEETING OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES

In accordance with Article II, Section 3 of the By-Laws, the annual meeting of the Board of Trustees was held 27 January 1956, in The National Archives Building, Washington, D. C. After ascertaining their willingness to serve further, with one exception the 1955 slate of officers was reelected for 1956. Brig. General Dale O. Smith, USAF, was elected vice president in place of Brig. General Herman Beukema, USA, Ret., who remains in Europe on an important educational assignment with our armed forces. The Board, in behalf of the Institute, expressed its deepest appreciation to the following officers for their excellent work in the Institute's behalf during 1955: President John D. Hayes, Secretary W. Cooper Foote,

Treasurer Ralph W. Donnelly, Editor Victor Gondos, Jr., Librarian George J. Stanfield, and Moncado Fund Chairman Henry M. Dater, and their several aides and associates. The reports of the officers were received and accepted. Motion was passed that the Treasurer shall also act as Business Manager as, for example, for handling advertisements. The Treasurer's report showed receipts of \$4263.61, expenditures of \$4146.19, and net worth of \$17,836.

Other items of significance reported at the Board meeting were: The Moncado Award of \$200 was made to Dr. Otis A. Singletary of Texas; the Institute co-sponsored with St. Johns College of Annapolis the Seminar on the Philosophy of War, for which the Institute Treasurer acted as financial clearing house; the revision of the Institute's 2d Class Mail Permit to allow the journal to carry paid advertising was completed during the summer, and the first paid advertisement appeared in the Fall Issue of *Military Affairs*, XIX, 3; three luncheon meetings were held, addressed by prominent speakers, 8 February, 26 May, and 19 October; a special membership meeting was held on 21 July, and the annual membership meeting and social hour in conjunction with AMI-AHA Joint Session was held 29 December; and, of course, four issues of *Military Affairs*, with a total of 232 pages, and the Index to Volume XVII were printed and distributed. Within the present financial resources of the Institute this, it is believed, is a creditable showing. To do more it will be necessary for the entire membership to bend to the task of increasing the Institute's resources.

ARMED FORCES DAY

This year *Armed Forces Day* is scheduled for May 19 1956. In selecting a date for this annual observance, the Department of Defense gave lengthy consideration to weather

and other important factors. The winter months were difficult because of the weather; the summer was unsuitable because schools and colleges would be unable to participate; and any date in the fall would conflict with school and college sports events. Thus, by the process of elimination, it was concluded that a date in the middle of May would involve the least conflict with public events, the weather, and with business, industry, and education. Accordingly, the President proclaimed the third Saturday in May, 1950, as the first *Armed Forces Day*, and it has been so maintained ever since.

Prior to 1950, there were a variety of military celebrations: Army Day on April 6 each year, Navy Day on October 27, and Air Force Day on September 18. In April 1949, the Secretary of Defense, with the President's approval, announced that the separate events would be consolidated into a single annual observance to be named *Armed Forces Day*. This consolidated observance was in line with the statutory unification of the Services, which it symbolizes, and to the public it demonstrates the interrelationship of the various elements of national defense—Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and the Reserve Components. Although the major emphasis of the Day is on the foregoing primary elements, invitations to participate have also been extended to auxiliary defense organizations, including Civil Defense, Ground Observer Corps, Civil Air Patrol, Selective Service, the National Blood Program, the Red Cross, and the United Services Organization.

The observance is now essentially an "open house" program in addition to the usual parade. Wherever feasible the public is invited to visit posts, camps, bases, armories, reserve centers, and other facilities in our national defense system. The public has taken advantage of the opportunity to make

an annual inspection of the system in which every American has a stake. In 1955, more than 2,500 "open house" programs at the various defense facilities, including GOC filter centers, and CAP airports, reported attendance of over 7,500,000 men, women, and children. Parades and reviews in which approximately half a million uniformed personnel participated were witnessed by more than 9,000,000 people. More than 2,000 community programs, such as luncheons, dinners, rallies, displays, and the like drew an estimated 3,000,000 persons. Thus, allowing for duplications, somewhere between fifteen and twenty million persons partook of some part of the observances of *Armed Forces Day* in 1955.

CIVIL WAR ROUND TABLE DOINGS

The January meeting of the Washington, D. C., Round Table was addressed by Congressman George A. Dondero of Michigan. An audience of over one hundred raptly attentive members listened to the endless fund of anecdote and reminiscence with which the Congressman is so richly endowed. He was given several standing ovations. An interesting sidelight on the Union President, as quoted from Colonel Gene Gimpel's *News Letter* is the following: "Mr. Robert Todd Lincoln, in answer to my question [Congressman Dondero's] as to what had become of his father's library, stated that his father did not have a library. When Lincoln died he had 10 or 12 books but that was all. One was the Bible which he kept open on his desk all through the time that he was President. . . . two other books were treatises on slavery, and the others were books on history and government which undoubtedly were given to the President by admiring friends. It is indeed a strange story . . . one of the world's great men who died with a library of less than a dozen books." One may

be pardoned for adding that Christ had even less than that.

Brig. General Carl Baehr has some data of interest to artillerymen in the February 1956 issue of the District of Columbia *News Letter*: The characteristics and thumb nail sketches of those three famous items of Union Civil War ordnance, the Rodman, the Dahlgren, and the Parrott guns.

Bruce Catton addressed the February Valentine's Day dinner meeting of the Washington Round Table, and drew the usual capacity crowd. Because of increasing attendance the locale of the meeting was shifted from the Army and Navy Club to Braun's Armon Restaurant. "Bruce Catton," says Program Chairman Kermit V. Sloan, "is a self-confessed collector of memories. From this penchant, cultivated during his boyhood in a small Michigan town, have come his now famous trilogy on the Army of the Potomac and a vast store of anecdotes associated with it." Those of us of his fellow members of the District Round Table who knew Editor Catton before his recent entry into the national hall of fame are deeply gratified but not surprised at his success with *American Heritage*. We cannot help feeling a wee bit of regret, however, that his status as a national literary figure no longer makes it possible to meet with us as often as was his wont.

The annual Gold Medal Award is being held this year on April 10th, in the Grand Ballroom of Braun's Armon Restaurant, 1320 G St. N. W., Washington, D. C. Colonel Robert Selph Henry, Past Award Winner, will preside. At the moment of going to press the awardee was not announced. Address inquiries to Maurice Blackwell, Box 808, Ben Franklin Station, Washington 4, D. C.

The New York Round Table held their December dinner at the New York Uni-

versity Faculty Club, where the noted Fletcher Pratt addressed the gathering; and the January 1956 meeting enjoyed the talk of Major General U. S. Grant III, devoted to the family life of his illustrious grandfather. The Lincoln-Civil War Society of Philadelphia presented Bruce Catton with another of his now interminable honors, at the Society's February 11 meeting; a scroll of honorary membership. Other Round Tables are invited to send news of their doings to the Editor of *Military Affairs*, National Archives, Washington 25, D. C.

AARON BURR ASSOCIATION MEETING

The annual meeting of the Aaron Burr Association, a patriotic society founded in 1946 by its current President General, Colonel Samuel Engle Burr, Jr., was held at historic Fraunces Tavern, at corner Broad and Pearl Streets, New York City, February 6, 1956. The Bicentennial of Burr's birth, February 6, 1756, was suitably celebrated with a banquet, addresses, and commemorative music composed for the occasion. Concurrently, small informal group gatherings were held in various parts of the country.

CIVIL DEFENSE LAG

Headed by General Otto Nelson, vice president of the New York Life Insurance Company, a report of thirteen prominent civilians called attention to civil defense needs against atomic, biologic, and chemical warfare. The report, released early in 1956, recommended that civil defense planning be based on metropolitan target zones rather than on individual cities, and that self-help planning for individual cities was impractical, thus calling for closer cooperation of Federal, state, and local defense agencies. The metro-

politan target areas listed are the following: New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Washington, Boston, Baltimore, Cleveland, Detroit, Milwaukee, St. Louis, Buffalo, Atlanta, Los Angeles, and San Francisco.

(Source: *N. Y. Times*, Jan. 4, 1956, p. 11)

SEVENTH REGIMENT ANNOUNCES 150TH ANNIVERSARY PLANS

One of the nation's most famous military units, the 7th Regiment of New York (107th Infantry, NYNG), will celebrate its 150th anniversary in May with the Veterans of the Seventh Regiment and the Seventh Regiment Post #107, American Legion. A grand review and a ball are planned for the evenings of May 4 and 5, respectively, at the Regiment's armory at Park Ave. and 67th St., N.Y.C. Former members of the Regiment will hold a reunion on Thursday, May 3. A pictorial history of the Regiment, edited by Col. Frederick P. Todd, director of the West Point Museum and a former member of the Regiment, and Maj. Kenneth Miller, will be published by Random House in March 1956.

MONCADO AWARD NOTICE

The Trustees of the American Military Institute and the Moncado Book Fund Committee desire to call attention to the fact that the third biennial competition for the Moncado Book Fund Award closes on June 30, 1956. The award, a cash prize of not less than \$200, will be given for the best, book-length manuscript on any topic connected with United States military, including naval and air, history. It is urged that all interested persons with eligible manuscripts forward them to the Secretary of the American Military Institute, 1529-18th St., N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

EDITORIAL



THE TEACHING OF MILITARY HISTORY

THE RESEARCH Studies Institute of the Air University recently published a pamphlet, *The Teaching of Military History in Colleges and Universities of the United States* (USAF Historical Study No. 124). This survey which contains both an excellent history of the subject and proposals on what should be done is the work of Dr. Richard C. Brown of Buffalo, N. Y. Dr. Brown is a member of the AMI and has had articles published in *Military Affairs*.

This document contains some figures that should disturb professional officers, members of the AMI, and concerned Americans. These show that less than five percent of our institutions of learning above the secondary grade offer courses dealing with military history, military policy, or military affairs.

In making his survey, Dr. Brown sent a questionnaire to the chairmen of the history departments of 815 institutions. Of these, 610 were universities and liberal arts colleges. The remainder included technical schools, colleges for women, and teachers' colleges. The key question was: "Does your institution offer courses in military history or policy?" Replies were received from 493, but of these only 37 answered affirmatively.

This situation exists in the face of the obvious military impact on modern society. It means that our future leaders are not studying the relations between foreign policy and military competence or how a military system must be integrated with our free institutions. They are not analyzing how our wars have (1) determined our geography and (2) stimulated our economy. They do not know that our Civil War, besides being still the Great American Experience, was the first of mod-

ern wars and that many lessons may be abstracted from its history. There may be a connection between all this and the fact disclosed by a recent national poll that few Americans want a military career as a life's work.

The lowest percentage of replies came from teachers' colleges—44 percent compared with 78 percent for the universities, and an over-all average of 60 percent. The inference can be drawn that those who teach our teachers are unconcerned about our military heritage and that grade and high school children, the future decision-making American public, may not be getting an adequate amount of military history in their social studies. This inference was recently supported by *This Week Magazine*, January 22d, 1956. An article entitled "Let's Put Pride Back in Our History Books" showed that many cherished national memories are fading because today's textbooks no longer find room for America's heroic episodes and gallant words.

Fortunately Dr. Brown's survey has an encouraging side. Interest in military history in our colleges and universities is small but growing, especially in the South and Southwest. This interest is not so much among the older professors. It is centered in a younger group on whom the reality of war has been impressed by events of the turbulent twentieth century. Some able scholars are devoting themselves entirely to military history. The survey shows that more would do so if they had the opportunity. The membership of AMI, the armed services, patriotic societies, and scholarly foundations must help these men in their all important task.

Those who follow us will not be able to afford the mistakes that we have made. JDH

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The aim of the American Military Institute is the encouragement of the serious study of all aspects of military (including naval and air) history. In the furtherance of this end the income from funds donated by Hilario Camino Moncado has been set aside to award biennially a cash prize for an original book-length manuscript in any field of United States military history. Manuscripts will be judged on the basis of thoroughness of research and quality of presentation as well as originality of contribution.

Inquiries regarding the competition for the award should be addressed to the Secretary of the American Military Institute.

The trustees and officers of the American Military Institute deeply regret to report the death of Hilario Camino Moncado at the comparatively early age of 58, at Agua Caliente, Mexico, on April 8, 1956. General Moncado was the donor of the Book Fund that bears his name.

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The objects of the AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTE, as stated in its Certificate of Incorporation, are "to stimulate and advance the study of military history,

especially that of the United States; to diffuse knowledge thereof by publications, displays, and otherwise; and to acquire and preserve manuscripts, publications, relics, and other material relating thereto."

Persons who wish to become members are invited to submit their names to the Secretary, American Military Institute 1529 - 18th Street, N. W., Washington (6), D. C. Annual dues are \$3.50; life membership, \$50; benefactor, \$250; and patron, \$500. Institutions and organizations may subscribe to MILITARY AFFAIRS.